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A Minnesota Lawyer's Guide to the Indian Child
Welfare Act
Peter W. Gorman* and Michelle Therese Paquin**
I. Introduction
In 1978, Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act
("ICWA")I, in an attempt to remedy abuses in the placement of
native children by courts and welfare agencies in states with native
populations.
Parts of the ICWA reflect Congress' recognition that Indian
tribes in the United States are sovereign nations which possess the
inherent authority to decide matters relating to their childrens' in-
terests. However, since the Supreme Court first recognized the
sovereignty of native Americans 150 years ago,2 United States pol-
icy towards tribal sovereignty has followed an erratic course. The
utter failure of many of these policies has led to a gradual dimin-
* Peter W. Gorman has been a staff lawyer with the Hennepin County Public
Defender since 1978, and is currently assigned to its appeals unit. He has defended
native parents since the Public Defender's Indian Parent Representation Unit was
established in 1983, and organized a training program on the Indian Child Welfare
Act for local defense lawyers in 1989. He was trial and appellate counsel for the
mother in In re B. W , 454 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) and recently co-au-
thored an amicus curiae brief to the Minnesota Court of Appeals in In re M.T.S.,
- N.W.2d - (Minn. Ct. App. September 15, 1992).
** Michelle Therese Paquin is a native person who is an enrolled member of
the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians. She has recently graduated from the Wil-
liam Mitchell College of Law, where she was a member of the American Indian
Law Students Association. She has been a law clerk for the Hennepin County Pub-
lic Defender, and presently works for the Hennepin County Juvenile Court.
We wish to thank Kathleen Trihey for the tribal court chart, and our col-
leagues Renee J. Bergeron, Susan M. Cochrane, John M. Stuart and Janet C. Wer-
ness for their editorial help on this project. We hope this project will assist our
colleagues and others who strive to help native families and their children.
1. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1923 (1988).
2. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). The Court's decision
in Cherokee Nation shows the decidedly one-sided nature of United States policy-
making toward Native Americans. In this case, the Cherokee sued Georgia in the
Supreme Court, to enjoin the state's interference with their Nation. Georgia
neither filed a brief nor appeared for argument. Under the rules of civil procedure
then in force, the Cherokee nation was entitled to a default judgment. Neverthe-
less, the Court held that, though sovereign, the Cherokee were really only quali-
fiedly sovereign. For that reason, and because it thought their cause too political,
the Court declined to grant them any relief.
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ishment of native sovereignty, and, eventually, to the abuses that
the ICWA was later enacted to remedy.
Consequently, some native people regard the ICWA as noth-
ing more than an incomplete effort by majority society to grant
them the right to determine their childrens' upbringing: a right
which they, as a sovereign people, feel they should never have lost.
Their suspicions have been reinforced by several state court cases,
decided after enactment of the ICWA, which still refuse native
tribes permission to decide the fate of their children in custody
proceedings.
In Minnesota, the ICWA nevertheless is a significant contri-
bution to native sovereignty, especially when applied in tandem
with related Minnesota statutes. This article is an effort to assist
Minnesota lawyers who represent participants in child protection
cases which involve native families. Minnesota lawyers on behalf
of their clients must demand compliance with the ICWA and re-
lated Minnesota statutes; if they do so, the ICWA's goal of native
self-determination will be fulfilled. We hope to provide them the
tools they need, and to demonstrate how the ICWA can be used to
assist in the development of native sovereignty.
Present-day Minnesota is home to thousands of native people,
including two Ojibwe tribes, four Dakota tribes and some Winne-
bago. Until 1988, there were no more than a handful of Minnesota
appellate cases dealing with the ICWA, and none of them treated
any portion of the ICWA in particularly great depth.3 In 1990 and
1991, however, the Minnesota Court of Appeals alone issued six
opinions which for the first time provided explicit guidance to
Minnesota lawyers for practice under the ICWA.4
3. In re Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 1980)(ICWA inapplicable); In re
R.M.M., 316 N.W.2d 538 (Minn. 1982); In re T.J.J., 366 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)(non-ICWA case
containing constitutional law and conflicts analysis which will be developed infra
note 329 and accompanying text); In re W.R., 379 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); In re R.I., 402 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In re C.C.T.L., No. C3-88-
253 (Minn. Ct. App. May 31, 1988). N.B.: Unpublished opinions of the Minnesota
Court of Appeals are not mandatory authority and are not precedential, see MINN.
STAT. § 480A.08 (1990). We have included citations to unpublished opinions in this
article so that local practitioners are fully informed of all interpretations of the
ICWA by Minnesota appellate courts. Copies of all unpublished decisions cited here
are on file with LAw & INEQUALITY.
4. In re M.M.O., No. C6-89-1598 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 1990)(ICWA applica-
bility-tribal membership); In re B.W., 454 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)(burden
of proof, tribal court transfer); In re M.S.S., 465 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991)(burden of proof, provision of remedial services); In re M.E.B., Nos. C6-90-
2370, C6-90-2388 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1991)(burden of proof, remedial services,
notice); In re V.R., No. C2-90-1765 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 1991)(burden of proof,
remedial services, notice); Sayers v. Beltrami County, 472 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. Ct.
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The ICWA has been implemented by state law or appellate
decisions in varying ways in perhaps half of the United States.
Most of these decisions come from states which have large native
populations. Some states enacted into state law a local equivalent
to the ICWA;5 implementation of the ICWA in most states, how-
ever, has been by judicial interpretation.
State appellate decisions, in Minnesota and elsewhere, exist
on virtually every portion of the ICWA. Most state decisions,
though, have been limited to questions of the ICWA's applicability,
and its notice, adjudicatory and placement sections. There does
not appear to be a nationwide state appellate court consensus on
any aspect of the ICWA; rather, what consensus there is appears to
be more regional than statute-based. Differences among state ap-
pellate court decisions range from fundamental philosophical dis-
cord concerning the essential purposes of the ICWA,6 to divergence
of opinion on more technical issues such as statutory construction.
7
Although a federal law, the ICWA is not a national substan-
tive code for juvenile child protection proceedings; it is, rather, an
evidentiary and procedural code which establishes minimum pro-
cedures for child protection proceedings in each state under each
state's substantive law. The ICWA, therefore, does not entirely
usurp the traditional role of state law in matters of child welfare
and custody.
Until quite recently, there has been no generally available de-
tailed periodical commentary on practice under the ICWA in Min-
nesota.8 For this reason, and because of the court of appeals'
recent ground-breaking decisions on practice under the ICWA, we
offer this guide for Minnesota lawyers.
App. 1991), reversed, 481 N.W.2d 547 (Minn. 1992))(ICWA and state law provisions
on out-of-home placements).
5. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 40.
6. Compare In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863 (Okla. 1988)(tribal court transfer) with In
re ArmeU, 550 N.E.2d 1060 (Ill. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 555 N.E.2d 374 (Ill.), cert
denied, 111 S.Ct. 345 (1990); compare In re Kreft, 384 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. Ct. App.
1986)(expert witnesses) with In re J.L.H., 316 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1982)(expert
witnesses).
7. Compare D.E.D. v. State, 704 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1985) with In re K.L.R.F.,
515 A.2d 33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal dismissed, 533 A.2d 708 (Pa. 1987).
8. Peter W. Gorman & Michelle T. Paquin, Custody and Ethnicity: Placing
Native Children in Minnesota, 48 BENCH & BAR MINN. 22 (August 1991)(an abbre-
viated guide to the ICWA); see also Marcia L. Howell-Rom, Note, The State of the
Act: The Indian Child Welfare Act in Minnesota After In the Matter of the Welfare




II. Where Does the Lawyer Working with Native Families in Juvenile
Court Child Protection Cases Find the Law?
A Minnesota lawyer practicing in juvenile court in a child
protection proceeding in which a native family is involved must
not only be familiar with the ICWA, but also with the relevant
state law and federal and state implementing regulations.
Minnesota has enacted several statutory schemes to comple-
ment the ICWA. The Minnesota Minority Heritage Act, for exam-
ple, complements the ICWA's placement provisions.9  The
Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act applies the ICWA's no-
tice and adjudicatory provisions to voluntary placements and en-
acts into state law certain jurisdictional provisions of the ICWA.10
Moreover, in 1989, the Minnesota legislature passed the "reason-
able efforts" law, which includes provisions relating to notice, ju-
risdiction, health and welfare hold hearings, placements and
remedial services. 11 These provisions complement the ICWA, and
specifically incorporate some ICWA provisions into state law. In
sum, a child protection proceeding in a Minnesota juvenile court
involving a native family, will, at some point, be affected not only
by the ICWA, but by each of these statutory schemes.
Shortly after the ICWA was enacted, the United States De-
partment of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs published imple-
menting guidelines for state courts. 12 These purport to offer the
Bureau's view for applying the ICWA's provisions in state court
proceedings. The Minnesota Department of Human Services fol-
lowed suit, and its regulations apply not only to the ICWA, but also
to the Minority Heritage Act and the Indian Family Preservation
Act.13
A. The Indian Child Welfare Act
The ICWA was passed by the United States Congress in 1978,
and went into effect in 1979. Congress heard extensive testimony
between 1973 and 1977 which revealed that child protection prac-
tices in the states resulted in huge inequalities between the place-
ment and adoption rates of native children and those rates for non-
native children.14 Congress noted in its report "[t]he wholesale
9. See infra text accompanying notes 56-62.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 47-55.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 63-72.
12. See infra text accompanying note 73.
13. See infra text accompanying note 74.
14. See generally Russel L. Barsh, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A
Critical Analysis, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1287, 1287-92 & nn.3-31 (1980)[hereinafter
Barsh]; Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 33-35 & nn.1-
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separation of Indian children from their families is perhaps the
most tragic and destructive aspect of American Indian life
today."15
The evidence before Congress showed "shocking"16 dispari-
ties in foster care placement rates. A survey conducted in 1967
and 1974 of several states, including Minnesota, found that native
children were placed in foster care five times more often than non-
native children.17 In 1972, another survey indicated that Minne-
sota native children were placed in foster care at the rate of 58.1
children per thousand, while non-native children were placed at a
rate of 3.5 per thousand.'8
The data Congress received regarding the disparity between
adoptions of native children and adoptions of non-native children
were equally discouraging. Adoption rates in Minnesota between
1964 and 1975 were 126.6 per thousand for native children as com-
pared to 32.2 per thousand for non-native children.19 One native
child in eight in Minnesota was in an adoptive home between 1969
and 1974; of those adopted, nearly one in four was under one year
of age.2o Perhaps most startling was the fact that ninety percent
of unrelated adoptions of native children in Minnesota were by
non-native families.21 Minnesota bore much of the criticism en-
gendered by this testimony and statistics; however, Congress noted
that Minnesota may have kept better statistics than most states
whose practices were surveyed.22
Testimony before Congress focused on the fact that white
agency social workers traditionally had exercised enormous, but
uninformed, discretion in deciding to place native children in fos-
ter care. These decisions were often based on the social workers'
cultural biases which affected their perceptions of native peoples'
use of alcohol, child rearing practices, and the use of multi-genera-
tional nuclear families for child care. These biases showed, of
course, that the huge rates of foster placement were largely
misguided.23
4 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1978), reprinted in 1978
USCCAN 7530, 7531 [hereinafter House Report]; see also Kathryn A. Carver, 'The
1985 Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act: Claiming A Cultural Identity," 4
LAW & INEQUALITY 327, 328-29 & nn. 7-8 (1986) [hereinafter, Carver].
15. House Report, supra note 14, at 9.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Barsh, supra note 14, at 1288 n.14.
19. Id.
20. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 33 (1989).
21. House Report, supra note 14, at 9.
22. Id.
23. House Report, supra note 14, at 10-11; Barsh, supra note 14, at 1294-96; see
1992]
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Social psychologists demonstrated at the hearings that large
removal rates resulted in significant problems for the children,
their families and their tribes. Dr. Joseph Westermeyer of the
University of Minnesota summarized his research on native adoles-
cents who had difficulty coping in white society:
[T]hey were raised with a white cultural and social identity.
They are raised in a white home. They attended, predomi-
nantly white schools, and in almost all cases, attended a
church that was predominantly white, and really came to un-
derstand very little about Indian culture, Indian behavior, and
had virtually no viable Indian identity... [D]uring adolescence,
they found that society was not to grant them the white iden-
tity that they had .... [T]hey were finding that society was put-
ting on them an identity which they didn't possess and taking
from them an identity that they did possess.24
Other witnesses reported that native children subjected to
long-term foster care had, as adults, higher rates of alcohol abuse
and suicide.25
The effect of a child's removal upon remaining family mem-
bers was shown at the hearings to be equally destructive. Dr. Wes-
termeyer reported that removal of a child "effectively destroyed
the family as an intact unit. The parents invariably separated. It
exacerbated the problems of alcoholism, unemployment, and emo-
tional duress among the parents[,]"26 and increased the likelihood
that other children would be removed as well.27
As the United States Supreme Court noted in Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, there was also considerable
emphasis at the hearings concerning the impact of the massive re-
moval of their children upon the tribes themselves. Chief Calvin
Isaac of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians testified:
Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly re-
duced if our children, the only real means for the transmission
of tribal heritage, are to be raised in non-Indian homes and de-
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 34-35: "One of the
most serious failings of the present system is that Indian children are removed
from the custody of their natural parents by nontribal government authorities who
have no basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and social premises underly-
ing Indian home life and childrearing. Many of the individuals who decide the fate
of our children are at best ignorant of our cultural values, and at worst contemptful
of the Indian way and convinced that removal, usually to a non-Indian household or
institution, can only benefit an Indian child." See also Carver, supra note 14 at 348
& nn.125-28.
24. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 33 n.1; see also
Carver, supra note 14 at 349-50.
25. Barsh, supra note 14, at 1290.
26. Id. at 1291; see also id. at 1292 ("[I]f you lose your children, you are dead;
you are never going to be rehabilitated, [and] you are never going to get well").
27. Id.
['Vol. 10:311
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nied exposure to the ways of their People. Furthermore, these
practices seriously undercut the tribes' ability to continue as
self-governing communities. 28
Based upon the testimony, Congress concluded that "there is
no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integ-
rity of Indian tribes than their children," and that "an alarmingly
high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal,
often unwarranted, of their children [and].. .placed in non-Indian
foster and adoptive homes. ."29 Congress also found that the
states, in exercising authority over child custody proceedings, often
failed to recognize native peoples' social and cultural standards.
3 0
In the ICWA's declared policy, Congress stated that it intended to
establish minimum federal standards for removal and placement
of native children which would reflect the unique values of Indian
culture. 3 ' The ICWA's provisions, particularly those establishing
burdens of proof and placement standards, are based on the testi-
mony before Congress, and respond specifically to the statute's
policy statement.
B. The Minnesota Juvenile Court Act
A Minnesota lawyer will find in the Minnesota Juvenile
Court Act the substantive laws providing for child protection pro-
ceedings. The ICWA imposes certain procedural requirements
upon these proceedings. The Juvenile Court Act contains the sub-
stantive provisions which authorize involuntary child protection
proceedings: temporary Child in Need of Protection or Services
("CHIPS")32 suits, or the permanent termination of parental
rights suits.33 The Juvenile Court Act also contains procedural
provisions governing preparation and filing of petitions,34 removal
of children from their homes,35 and provisions relating to trial36
and post-trial dispositions.3 7 Portions of the Minnesota Minority
28. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 34 (1989). "If
tribal sovereignty is to have any meaning at all at this juncture of history, it must
necessarily include the right, within its own boundaries and membership, to pro-
vide for the care and upbringing of its young, a sine qua non to the preservation of
its identity." Wisconsin Potowatomies of the Hannahville Indian Community v.
Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719, 730 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
29. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3),(4) (1988).
30. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1988).
31. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988).
32. MINN. STAT. § 260.015, subd. 2a (1990). Some lawyers use the terms "legal
custody" interchangeably with CHIPS.
33. MINN. STAT. § 260.221 (1990).
34. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.131, 260.133, 260.135, 260.141 (1990).
35. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.165, 260.171-260.173 (1990).
36. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.155-260.156 (1990).
37. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.191, 260.231, 260.235, 260.241-260.242 (1990).
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Law and Inequality
Heritage Act3s and all of the 1989 "reasonable efforts" law 39 are in
the Juvenile Court Act.
The CHIPS statute4° authorizes a public agency or private pe-
titioner to seek the juvenile court's jurisdiction over a child. It
provides the juvenile court authority4 ' to obtain formal custody
over a child for various reasons, such as environmental neglect or
physical abuse. 42 Prior to 1988, CHIPS proceedings were referred
to as proceedings for dependency or neglect.4
3
The Juvenile Court Act also provides the court with author-
ity to terminate a person's parental rights to a child. While this is
usually an involuntary procedure, 44 the statute permits a volun-
tary termination of parental rights.45 The former usually involves
a more aggravated situation, often one in which a prior CHIPS
proceeding failed to correct conditions in the child's home. There
are eight types of involuntary termination proceedings, which
range from palpable unfitness of the parent to uncorrected condi-
tions which had previously led to court jurisdiction. 46
C. The Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act
The Indian Family Preservation Act was enacted by the Min-
nesota legislature in 1985.4 7 It placed into state law many, but not
all, of the provisions of the ICWA. 4s Most of its definitions corre-
spond to those in the ICWA. The Indian Family Preservation Act
is particularly useful to a Minnesota lawyer because it applies spe-
cifically to situations in which a parent voluntarily places a child
in foster care, and imposes specific duties upon a local welfare
agency or a private placement agency when a native child is volun-
38. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 260.181, subd. 3 (1990). For discussion of Minnesota
Minority Heritage Act see infia notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
39. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.012; 260.015, subds. la, 11, 13, 14, 26, 27; 260.111; 260.135,
subd. 2; 260.141, subd. 2a; 260.155, subds. 4, 7; 260.165, subd. 1; 260.171, subd. 1;
260.172, subds. 1, 4; 260.173, subd. 2; 260.181, subd. 2; 260.191, subds. la, le; 260.231,
subd. 3 (1990). For discussion of the 1989 "reasonable efforts" law see infra notes
63-72 and accompanying text.
40. MINN. STAT. § 260.015, subd. 2a (1990).
41. Such authority must be alleged in a petition prepared under MINN. STAT.
§ 260.131 (1990).
42. As in other areas of the law, a juvenile court petition can allege and seek
the court's jurisdiction under multiple statutory theories.
43. MINN. STAT. § 260.015, subds. 6, 10 (1986) (Many other portions of the Juve-
nile Court Act were amended with this provision in 1988.)
44. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. 1(b) (1990).
45. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. 1(a) (1990).
46. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. 1(b)(4); § 260.221, subd. 1(b)(5) (1990).
47. MINN. STAT. §§ 257.351-257.3579 (1990); see generally Carver, supra note 14.
48. MINN. STAT. §§ 257.351, subds. 3, 5, 6-9, 11, 13-15; 257.354, subds. 1, 3-5 (1990).
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tarily placed or even considered for placement.49 The most impor-
tant of those specific duties is that of notification to the tribe and
its social services agency.50
Application of the Indian Family Preservation Act to volun-
tary placements distinguishes it from the ICWA, since the federal
statute may not apply to some types of voluntary placements.51
Although the ICWA's applicability to voluntary placements has
been occasionally questioned in court decisions in other states, in
Minnesota, the Indian Family Preservation Act's provisions will
control because they provide a higher standard of protection to na-
tive families.
52
Aside from the definitions53 and voluntary placement provi-
sions, the other portions of the Indian Family Preservation Act
which transfer ICWA provisions into state law are concerned with
tribal court jurisdiction matters.54 These provisions are not as es-
sential to the Minnesota lawyer because the ICWA's rules will gov-
ern in any event.5 5
D. The Minnesota Minority Heritage Act
The Minority Heritage Act was passed by the Minnesota leg-
islature in 1983,56 and is found throughout Chapters 257, 259 and
260 of Minnesota Statutes.57 The Minority Heritage act requires
the local welfare agency and the Department of Human Services
49. MINN. STAT. §§ 257.352; 257.353 (1990).
50. MINN. STAT. §§ 257.352, subds. 2-3; 257.353, subds. 2-3 (1990). The impor-
tance of this provision's role in filling a gap in the ICWA lies in the dynamics of the
tribal-state relationship and the state agency-native family relationship. Carver
notes that the "temporary" nature of foster care, especially for Minnesota minority
children, is a myth and that the act's provisions for early notice to, and intervention
by, the tribe serves to prevent unnecessary, and culturally-biased, placements.
Carver, supra note 14 at 345-47.
51. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988) and Carver, supra note 14 at 334-35, 345-
47; see also infra text accompanying notes 113-16, discussing the definition of a fos-
ter care placement, which triggers applicability of the ICWA, and text accompany-
ing notes 129-48, discussing whether and under which circumstances a voluntary
placement in any form is subject to ICWA requirements.
52. 25 U.S.C. § 1921 (1988). See also text accompanying notes 97-99.
53. MINN. STAT. §§ 257.351, subds. 3, 5, 6-9, 11, 13-15 (1990).
54. MINN. STAT. § 257.354, subds. 1, 3-5 (1990).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 92-99.
56. 1983 MINN. LAWS ch. 278.
57. MINN. STAT. §§ 257.01; 257.065; 257.071, subds. la, 2, 6; 257.072; 259.255;
259.27, subds. 1, 2; 259.28, subd. 2; 259.455; 260.181, subd. 3; 260.191, subds. 1, 1a;
260.192; 260.242, subd. la (1990). The Minnesota Court of Appeals recently invali-
dated a portion of the Minority Heritage Act on equal protection grounds. In re
D.L., 479 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). This holding has little relevance to the
lawyer representing native clients because of traditional equal protection analysis
in Indian law. See infra text accompanying notes 107-108. In affirming the Court
of Appeals, the Supreme Court did not address the constitutional issue. In re D.L.,
1992]
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to recruit foster families and place children in accord with their
racial, cultural, and religious preferences. The ICWA is silent on
the issue of state recruitment of foster families and religious pref-
erences, and therefore does not preempt the Minority Heritage
Act's requirements. 58 A portion of the Minority Heritage Act per-
mits a biological parent to specifically request that the preferences
expressed in the statute be disregarded.59 The corresponding pro-
vision of the ICWA merely requires that a child or parent's prefer-
ence be considered.60 This minor conflict between these two
provisions is not sufficient to raise a Supremacy Clause issue.
61
The Minority Heritage Act applies to adoptive placements, to
foster care placements, and, unlike the ICWA, to all voluntary
placements. Its preferences are less specific than those contained
in the ICWA, but are compatible with the ICWA's.62
E. 1989 "Reasonable Efforts" Legislation
In 1989, the Minnesota Legislature passed what has come to
be known as the "reasonable efforts" law.63 Extensive lobbying ef-
forts by lawyers and legal services offices working with native and
minority families contributed to this legislation. It is found
throughout Chapter 260 of Minnesota Statutes.64
The "reasonable efforts" law incorporates into state law addi-
tional portions of the ICWA not considered by the Indian Family
Preservation Act.65 Specifically, it requires the trial courts to
486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1992). The legislature responded to the Court of Appeals'
constitutional concerns, see 1992 Minn. Laws, ch. 557.
58. 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988).
59. MINN. STAT. §§ 259.255; 260.181, subd. 3 (1990). See In re M.M., 436 N.W.2d
827 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd 452 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 1990).
60. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1988).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 92-99.
62. The portion of the Minority Heritage Act which applies to voluntary place-
ments is MINN. STAT. § 257.071, subd. la. The ICWA preferences applying to invol-
untary placements are found in 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (b),(c),(d) (1988).
63. 1989 MINN. LAws ch. 235. The legislature in the purposes clause used the
term "reasonable efforts" to describe efforts required to prevent placement of chil-
dren, and defined in the statute what it meant by "reasonable efforts." See MINN.
STAT. § 260.012(b).
64. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.012; 260.015, subds. la, 11, 13, 14, 26, 27; 260.111, subd. 5;
260.135, subd. 2; 260.141, subd. 2a; 260.155, subds. 4, 7; 260.165, subd. 1; 260.171, subd.
1; 260.172, subds. 1, 4; 260.173, subd. 2; 260.181, subd. 2; 260.191, subds. la, le; 260.231,
subd. 3 (1990). See also infra text accompanying notes 154 and 391-93 for a discus-
sion of the meaning of "reasonable efforts."
65. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.012, subd. a; 260.015, subd. 13; 260.111, subd. 5; 260.135,
subd. 2; 260.141, subd. 2a; 260.165, subd. 1(c)(2); 260.172, subd. 1 (1990). Other por-
tions of the 1989 act repeat portions of the ICWA enacted into state law by the In-
dian Family Preservation Act. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 260.015, subds. 11, 14, 26, 27
(1990).
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make findings, both before and after adjudication, consistent with
the burdens of proof imposed by the ICWA.66 It also contains a
preference for native guardians-ad-litem for native children.
6 7
The "reasonable efforts" law contains two provisions which
complement the parallel provisions of the ICWA, and thus effec-
tively transfer portions of the ICWA into Minnesota law. The first
of these restricts pre-adjudicatory placements in three ways: a) it
applies the ICWA's "reasonable efforts" proof requirement to
placements made in connection with an emergency health and
welfare hold hearing, i.e, a pretrial placement;68 b) it permits a
parent to recommend at that hearing alternate placements to that
chosen by the welfare agency;69 c) it requires that placements of
children at the health and welfare hold hearing stage be the least
restrictive setting possible and in close proximity to the child's
family or with a relative.
70
The second parallel between the reasonable efforts law and
the ICWA incorporates the ICWA's "remedial efforts" section7 '
and establishes that a Minnesota trial court may not make a pre-
adjudicatory or a post-adjudicatory decision on a child protection
case without also considering the level of services provided the
family, the appropriateness of those services, and their
effectiveness.
72
F. Federal and State Implementing Regulations
Shortly after enactment of the ICWA, the Department of the
Interior published implementing regulations for state court prac-
tice under the ICWA, which have become known as the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) Guidelines. 73 The Minnesota Department of
Human Services (MDHS) issued its own set of regulations
("MDHS Regulations") 7 4 after passage of the Indian Family Pres-
ervation Act and the Minority Heritage Act.
The BIA Guidelines and the MDHS Regulations both operate
to fill gaps left by the ICWA, and provide practitioners and judges
66. MINN. STAT. § 260.012, subd. a; 260.172, subd. 1 (1990).
67. MINN. STAT. § 260.155, subd. 4(d) (1990).
68. MINN. STAT. § 260.012, subds. a, c; 260.172, subd. 1 (1990).
69. MINN. STAT. § 260.172, subd. 4 (1990).
70. MINN. STAT. § 260.173, subd. 2 (1990).
71. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1988).
72. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.012, subds. a, c; 260.155, subds. 7(6),7(7); 260.191, subds.
la, le (1990).
73. BuREAu OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T. OF THE INTERIOR, Guidelines for
State Courts, 44 Fed. Reg. 67584-67595 (1979)[hereinafter BIA Guidelines].
74. MINNESOTA DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, Social SerVices Manual, XIII-3500
to XIII-3630 (January 30, 1987)[hereinqfter MDHS Regulations].
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with guidance as to what Congress intended in particular situa-
tions. Many portions of the ICWA - in keeping with its original
goal of establishing minimum standards - prescribe only bare out-
lines of recommended procedure, and leave the details to the
guidelines, regulations and state court decisions. 75 Consequently, a
Minnesota lawyer cannot practice under the ICWA and related
Minnesota statutes without knowledge of both the BIA Guidelines
and the MDHS Regulations.
The BIA Guidelines are interpretations of various provisions
of the ICWA by the Department of the Interior. According to the
Department of the Interior, they do not have binding legislative ef-
fect and are not mandatory authority.76 However, the Department
also mandates that, to the extent that it is correct in its interpreta-
tions, contrary determinations by state courts are violations of the
ICWA.77 Most courts which have considered the issue have held
that the BIA Guidelines are not binding, but are entitled to consid-
erable deference and great weight.
7 8
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in In re TJ.J., initially
agreed that the MDHS Regulations, like the BIA Guidelines, were
not mandatory and held that they did not "singularly control the
trial court."79 However, five years later, the court overruled In re
TJ.J. in its 1990 decision In re B. W 80 One of the issues before the
court in In re B. W. was whether the MDHS Regulations con-
trolled over the BIA Guidelines when the MDHS Regulations pro-
vided more protection to the native litigant. Basing its decision on
section 1921 of the ICWA and the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfteld,81
the court held emphatically that the state regulations controlled.8 2
No subsequent Minnesota case has suggested since In re B. W. that
75. See e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (e), (f) (1988).
76. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67584.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., D.E.D. v. State, 704 P.2d 774, 779 n.8 (Alaska 1985); In re K.L.R.F.,
515 A.2d 33, 35 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal dismissed, 533 A.2d 708 (Pa. 1987);
In re Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 970 (Utah 1986); In re T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 307
(Ind. 1988); In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1065 (Ill. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 555
N.E.2d 374 (Ill.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 345 (1990).
79. In re T.J.J., 366 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
80. In re B.W., 454 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
81. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
82. In re B.W., 454 N.W.2d at 443-44. "In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's
analysis of the problem and the role of the state courts in Holyfield and applying
§ 1921 of the ICWA, we conclude that we cannot recognize the vitality of the hold-
ing in T.J.J. leaving application of the evidentiary standards in the DHS manual to
the discretion of state trial courts.. .we feel it is essential to the recognition of the
purposes of the ICWA that if a trial court does not apply the standards in the
[M]DHS manual, that court should make explicit findings as to why it (did not]."
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the federal and state regulations are anything but mandatory.
8 3
Ill. Threshold Issues: Statutory Construction, Preemption/Supremacy
Clause, and the ICWA's Constitutionality
A. Statutory Construction
Statutory construction arguments usually relate to questions
such as these:
- did the legislature really say that?
- if so, did the legislature really mean to say that?
- how literally should a statute be applied to a particular set
of facts?
- how are two apparently conflicting statutes applied?
These types of questions will certainly arise in state court
proceedings under the ICWA. The questions may be provoked by
the ICWA's proof requirements which differ from Minnesota law,
or by the differences between the BIA Guidelines and the MDHS
Regulations.
Most lawyers are at least vaguely familiar with the standard
rules of statutory construction contained in chapter 645 of Minne-
sota Statutes and in common law rules of construction. Some of
the same rules and some different rules apply to construction of
statutes in the area of Indian law. Lawyers who practice under the
ICWA and related state statutes should keep these principles in
mind.
The basic rules are simply summarized: To determine
whether Indian rights exist, the statute is to be liberally inter-
preted; to determine whether Indian rights are to be abridged or
abrogated, the statute is to be strictly construed.
8 4
The foremost of these principles is that statutes "passed for
the benefit of dependent Indian tribes... are to be liberally con-
strued, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indi-
ans."8 5 A related tenet is that remedial and humanitarian statutes
are to be given a liberal construction.86 Although no Minnesota
court has ruled on the issue, a number of courts in other states
See infra text accompanying notes 98-99; see also In re M.S.S., 465 N.W.2d 412, 417
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991):
83. In re M.S.S., 465 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
84. See David H. Getches and Charles F. Wilkinson, Federal Indian Law: Cases
and Materials 217 (2d Ed. 1986).
85. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); Three Affiliated Tribes of
the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 149 (1984); State v.
Forge, 262 N.W.2d 341, 347 (Minn. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 919 (1978); In re
Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 935 (N.J. 1988).
86. Harrison v. Schafer Constr. Co., 257 N.W.2d 336, 338 (Minn. 1977).
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have held that the ICWA is, in fact, remedial legislation, and there-
fore should be liberally construed.8 7
A second rule of construction is that of "express mention and
implied exclusion." This rule holds that when a legislature speci-
fies an item in a statute, other items not specified by the legisla-
ture are excluded from the statute.8 8 Several areas of the ICWA
suggest application of this rule.8 9
The rules for construction of statutes in the area of Indian
law are quite similar to those for construction of treaties,90 and, in
fact, the former derive from the latter.9i
B. Preemption/Supremacy Cause
The ICWA was enacted by Congress under authority derived
from the Indian Commerce Clause92 of the United States Constitu-
tion. Congressional enactments under the Indian Commerce
Clause - by virtue of the Supremacy Clause93 - preempt any con-
tradictory state law,94 for, "[w]hen Congress legislates pursuant to
87. See, e.g., In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Mont. 1981); In re K.L.R.F., 515
A.2d 33, 37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal dismissed, 533 A.2d 708 (Pa. 1987). See also
BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67586.
88. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 47 n.22
(1989); In re Q.G.M., 808 P.2d 684, 688 (Okla. 1991). See also Andrus v. Glover Con-
str. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980)("Buy Indian" statute); Bryan v. Itasca County,
426 U.S. 373, 392-93 (1976); Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1976)(In-
dian Civil Rights Act); In re S.B.R., 719 P.2d 154, 156 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)("ex-
press mention, implied exclusion" rule applies to ICWA); In re Baby Girl A., 282
Cal. Rptr. 105, 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)(rule does not apply to ICWA to vary clear
legislative intent); Maytag Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 17 N.W.2d 37, 39
(Minn. 1944)(business tax).
89. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1922 (1988). See note 120; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988)
and text accompanying notes 129-148 discussing types of voluntary proceedings sub-
ject to the ICWA.
90. State v. Keezer, 292 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Minn. 1980).
91. See David H. Getches, Daniel M. Rosenfelt & Charles F. Wilkinson, Federal
Indian Law: Cases and Materials 200 (1979).
92. The Indian Commerce Clause is found in ART. I, SECnoN 8, CLAUSE 3, and
gives to Congress the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. See 25
U.S.C. § 1901 (1988); In re D.L.L. and C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 281 (S.D. 1980); In re
Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1067-68 (Ill. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 555 N.E.2d 374 (Ill.),
cert denied, 111 S.Ct. 345 (1990). See House Report, supra note 14, at 13-19.
93. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 reads as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
94. See David H. Getches and Charles F. Wilkinson, Federal Indian Law: Cases
and Materials 332-33 (2d Ed. 1986) and House Report, supra note 14, at 17-19. See
also In re Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 966 (Utah 1986).
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its delegated powers, conflicting state law and policy must yield.95
As the Utah Supreme Court articulated:
Under general supremacy principles, state law cannot be per-
mitted to operate as an obstacle to the accomplishment and ex-
ecution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
.. [W]here Indian affairs are concerned, a broad test of pre-
emption is to be applied.96
In only one respect does the ICWA not preempt contradictory
state law. Consistent with the goal of the ICWA to set minimum
federal standards for the conduct of state court proceedings, 97 sec-
tion 1921 of the ICWA states that state law standards providing
better protection of native parental rights remain valid.98 Under
this section, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has twice held that
the expert witness guidelines published by the Minnesota Depart-
ment of Human Services prevail over the somewhat less explicit
guidelines published by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.99
C. Constitutionality of the ICWA
The principal constitutional challenges to the ICWA have
been based on the Fifth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion. The Fifth Amendment challenge is grounded in the equal
protection guarantee which has been read into the amendment's
Due Process Clause by judicial decision.100 It is primarily ad-
dressed to the portion of the ICWA which establishes exclusive tri-
bal court jurisdiction under certain circumstances,' 0 ' and posits
that denial of access to state courts to certain classes of litigants on
95. House Report, supra note 14, at 13.
96. In re Halloway, 732 P.2d at 967.
97. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988).
98. 25 U.S.C. § 1921 (1988). The Department of the Interior urged the Congress
to add this language. See House Report, supra note 14, at 34.
99. In re B.W., 454 N.W.2d 437, 442-44 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); In re M.S.S., 465
N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). See infra text accompanying notes 364-380
discussing the two sets of guidelines for expert witnesses. Minnesota lawyers
should also note that Minnesota's best interests of the child standard in child pro-
tection cases should change under a 1990 Minnesota statute which specifically states
that a native child's best interests must be determined consistently with the ICWA
and the Indian Family Preservation Act. See MINN. STAT. § 260.011, subd. 2 (1990)
and In re M.T.S., No. FX-91-50419 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 7th Dist. filed January 16, 1992)
a copy of which is on file with LAW AND INEQUALITY. The trial court's decision in
In re M.T.S. was affirmed as this article was going to press by the Minnesota Court
of Appeals, which held that Minnesota's best interests of the child rule is pre-
empted by the ICWA. In re M.T.S., - N.W.2d - (Minn. Ct. App. September 15,
1992).
100. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954). See generally Edward S.
Corwin, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 330-31 (Harold W. Chase
and Craig R. Ducat ed. 1973).
101. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (a), (b) (1988).
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account of race constitutes invidious discrimination.10 2 This view
was one of the reasons the Department of Justice objected to the
ICWA before its enactment. 0 3 As noted in the legislative history
of the ICWA,104 a long line of decisions of the United States
Supreme Court,105 and every state court which has considered this
equal protection challenge has decisively refuted it.106
A related claim holds that according native peoples privileges
under federal law not made available to non-native peoples vio-
lates equal protection suspect class principles under traditional
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment analysis. This claim, which is
not limited to complaints about the ICWA, has also been consist-
ently rejected. 0 7 As an Illinois appellate court noted, "[flederal
legislation with respect to Indian tribes is not based upon imper-
missible racial classifications, but derives from the special status of
Indians as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities."'
0 8
The Tenth Amendment'0 9 challenge suggests that Congress,
by dictating minimum federal procedural and evidentiary stan-
dards to the state courts concerning the operation of their juvenile
courts, intrudes upon the residual rights left to the states by the
Constitution. The Department of Justice objected to the ICWA,
before its enactment, on this ground."l0 A similar objection has
been raised in at least two state court proceedings under the
ICWA.111
102. House Report, supra note 14 at 35-39.
103. I.
104. House Report, supra note 14, at 13-19.
105. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 390-91 (1976), where the Court said,
The exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive from the
race of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi-sovereign status of the
. . Tribe under federal law. Moreover, even if a jurisdictional holding
occasionally results in denying an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a
non-Indian has access, such disparate treatment of the Indian is justi-
fied because it is intended to benefit the class of which he is a member
by furthering the congressional policy of Indian self-government.
106. See, e.g., In re D.L.L. and C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 281 (S.D. 1980); In re Ap-
peal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 635 P.2d 187, 193 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981), cert
denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); In re Angus, 655 P.2d 208, 213 (Or. Ct. App. 1982), re-
view dismissed, 660 P.2d 683 (Or.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983).
107. See, e.g., In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1067 (Ill. Ct. App.), appeal denied,
555 N.E.2d 374 (Ill.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 345 (1990)(ICWA); State v. Forge, 262
N.W.2d 341, 347-48 (Minn. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 919 (1978)(fishing
treaty rights). See also Carver, supra note 14 at 349.
108. In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d at 1067.
109. The Tenth Amendment states: 'The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend X.
110. House Report, supra note 14, at 39-40.
111. In re D.L.L. and C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 281 (S.D. 1980); In re T.R.M., 525
N.E.2d 298, 303 n.1 (Ind. 1988).
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The legislative history and at least one state-court decision
conclusively rebuts the Tenth Amendment claim. Given the ple-
nary power of Congress to regulate Indian affairs, the long-stand-
ing rule is that Congressional legislation on Indian affairs does not
violate the Tenth Amendment as long as the power is not exer-
cised arbitrarily.112
The law in this area appears to be settled: currently, there is
no constitutional impediment to the ICWA.
IV. To Which Litigants Do These Laws Apply?
The ICWA does not apply to every native person in every ju-
venile court child protection proceeding across the state and coun-
try. Although a mother may consider herself a native person, and
may have been raised in a native community and according to na-
tive customs, the ICWA does not necessarily apply to a particular
juvenile court proceeding involving her and her children. Whether
the ICWA applies depends upon factors such as the type of pro-
ceeding involved, the type of placement, and tribal enrollment
criteria.
A. Which Types of Proceedings?
1. Child Custody Proceedings Under the ICWA
The key to applicability of the ICWA and the Indian Family
Preservation Act is whether a juvenile court proceeding is a "child
custody proceeding." If a proceeding is not a "child custody pro-
ceeding," most of the ICWA's provisions, such as those for transfer
to tribal court, notice, intervention, proof requirements, placement
preferences, and collateral attack may not apply.
Both the ICWA and the Indian Family Preservation Act de-
fine a "child custody proceeding" to include "foster care place-
ments," termination of parental rights, "preadoptive placements,"
and "adoptive placements." 113 Of these definitions, that of a "fos-
ter care placement" is the most important to the applicability of
the ICWA. It is defined as "any action removing an Indian child
from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement in a
foster home.. .where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have
the child returned on demand."114 This last clause of the defini-
112. House Report, supra note 14, at 17-19; In re D.L.L. and C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d
at 281.
113. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988); MINN. STAT. § 257.351, subd. 3 (1990). See also
MDHS Regulations, XIII-3513(2), discussing each term's definition.
114. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i) (1988)(emphasis added). The Indian Family Preserva-
tion Act, MINN. STAT. § 257.351, subd. 3(b) (1990), refers to this as an involuntary
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tion of "foster care placement" bears particular emphasis because
that language determines, in most cases, whether the ICWA, as a
threshold matter, is even applicable.115 Some courts in other
states have mistakenly held, based upon that language, that no
part of the ICWA is applicable to voluntary placements.116
The other three definitions of "child custody proceedings,"
which Minnesota courts have not, as of yet, addressed are:
- a termination of parental rights means any action resulting
in the termination of the parent-child relationship.
1 1 7
- a "preadoptive placement" means the temporary placement
of an Indian child in a foster home or institution after ter-
mination of parental rights but before adoption." 8
- an "adoptive placement" is the permanent placement of an
Indian child for adoption." 9
Based on the definitions of "child custody proceedings," it is
easy to see which analogous proceedings under Minnesota law
would be covered by the ICWA and the Indian Family Preserva-
tion Act:
- a temporary placement after a child has been picked up by
the police or otherwise on an emergency health and welfare
hold, after a hearing has been held in juvenile court; 120
foster care placement to distinguish the situation from voluntary placements, which
may not be subject to some ICWA requirements. See also text accompanying notes
129-48.
115. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. The ICWA will apply to pro-
ceedings as a result of which a child could be placed. Whether the child is actually
placed is not the ICWA threshhold. State ex. rel Juvenile Dep't of Multnomah
County v. Cooke, 744 P.2d 596, 597-98 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); In re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d
311, 321 (Iowa 1984).
116. See cases collected at notes 135-36, infra. We have argued infr , text ac-
companying notes 135-45, why we believe that parts of the ICWA should apply to
some types of voluntary placements.
117. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(ii) (1988); MINN. STAT. § 257.351, subd. 3(d) (1990).
118. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(iii) (1988); MINN. STAT. § 257.351, subd. 3(c) (1990).
119. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(iv) (1988); MINN. STAT. § 257.351, subd. 3(a) (1990).
120. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.171-260.172 (1990). Since a placement made by the court
hearing an emergency health and welfare hold proceeding is one in which, by defi-
nition, the parent cannot on demand have the child returned, it is, in fact, a "foster
care placement" within the meaning of the ICWA. This means that the ICWA's no-
tice, adjudicatory, expert witness and placement preference sections, at a minimum,
apply. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 113-16. Although there is some disa-
greement on this point among Hennepin County Juvenile Court practitioners, that
court recently accepted this view in In re C.C., File 152933-94 (Minn. Juv. Ct. April,
1991). A copy of the memorandum of law supporting this position in that case is on
file with LAW & INEQUALITY. This is not to say that there must be a contested
hearing in compliance with the ICWA before the police can even pick up a child. It
is to say, however, that the state-law health and welfare hold hearing which must
take place after the child is picked up must comply with the ICWA. One foreign
case disagrees with this analysis, holding that the notice requirements of 25 U.S.C.
§ 1912 (1988) do not apply to emergency health and welfare hold hearings. D.E.D.
v. State, 704 P.2d 774, 779 (Alaska 1985). See also State ex rel Juvenile Dep't of
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- a placement after the filing of a CHIPS petition in juvenile
court, regardless of whether there has been an emergency
health and welfare hold proceeding,'
2 '
- placements made after the juvenile court adjudicates, after
trial or admission, a CHIPS petition;
22
- placements made in connection with a termination of paren-
tal rights.12 3
All of these types of placements, at least those that remain in
state court, will be subject to the notice, adjudicatory and place-
ment preference sections of the ICWA, and the placements must
also comply with the Minority Heritage Act.124
Multnomah County v. Charles, 688 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), review dis-
missed, 701 P.2d 1053 (Or. 1985)(suggesting that some ICWA requirements might
not apply to these hearings). The Minnesota Court of Appeals suggested, in dicta,
that it might agree with this latter position in an opinion filed as this article went
to press. In re J.A.S., 488 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). We have demon-
strated here why we believe that this view is mistaken.
A related issue is whether, under the ICWA, a Minnesota juvenile court even
has jurisdiction to preside over a health and welfare hold proceeding involving a
child not residing or domiciled on a reservation. The ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1922 sug-
gests by negative implication that only children domiciled or residing on a reserva-
tion but temporarily off the reservation can be subject of a health and welfare hold
proceeding in state court. A literal reading of § 1922 provides a state court, at best,
no more than concurrent, emergency jurisdiction with the tribal court, over its
domiciliaries. [This concurrent jurisdiction is usually called referral jurisdiction.]
See In re R.I., 402 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). As noted earlier, the stat-
utory construction canon of "express inclusion, implied exclusion" applies in Indian
law, and would suggest that § 1922's specific grant of authority excludes all others.
See supra text accompanying notes 88-89. Professor Barsh's article agrees with this
interpretation, although he believes that it is a drafting error. Barsh, supra note
14, at 1318-19. One case suggests otherwise. State em reL Juvenile Dep't of Multno-
mah County v. Charles, 688 P.2d 1354, 1358 n.2 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), review dis-
missed, 701 P.2d 1053 (Or. 1985)(citing legislative history). The Minnesota
Legislature was urged in 1984 to close this apparent gap but did not do so. 1984 H.F.
1502. See Carver, supra note 14 at 338-44 for analysis of the history of H.F. 1502 in
1984. The 1989 "reasonable efforts" legislation, MINN. STAT. § 260.165, subd. 1(c)(2)
(1990) enacted into Minnesota law 25 U.S.C. § 1922 without change notwithstanding
the apparent gap which had been called to its attention in 1984. A copy of a memo-
randum of law filed in support of this position, which was not adopted by the Hen-
nepin County Juvenile Court, in In re M.G., File 120525-95 (Minn. Juv. Ct. Nov.
1984) is on file with LAW & INEQUALITY. At and before the time that motion was
filed, we were advised that Arizona and New Mexico were taking the same position
in an effort not to provide services to non-reservation children, and changed their
position under threat of a lawsuit. Letter from Craig J. Dorsay (January 7, 1985)
(on file with LAw & INEQUALITY).
In its decision in In re J.A.S., 488 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), which was
filed as this article went to press, the court of appeals assumed without deciding
that § 1922 applies to children not domiciled or residing on a reservation. For the
reasons discussed here, we believe that this view is mistaken.
121. MINN. STAT. § 260.173 (1990).
122. MINN. STAT. § 260.191 (1990).
123. MINN. STAT. § 260.242 (1990).
124. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1912, 1915 (1988); MINN. STAT. §§ 259.255, 259.28, 260.181, subd.
3, 260.191, subd. la, 260.242 (1990).
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2. Some Types of Proceedings Are Excluded
Neither the ICWA nor the Indian Family Preservation Act
applies to juvenile court delinquency prosecutions. 2 5 Both laws,
however, do apply to juvenile court status delinquency proceed-
ings, such as liquor, curfew and truancy violations. 126 Neither act
applies to placements of children resulting from a divorce proceed-
ing,127 unless a person other than a parent seeks custody.12
8
3. The Problem of Voluntary Proceedings
In recent years, Minnesota welfare agencies have attempted
to reduce involuntary removals and placements of children by en-
couraging parents, sometimes with implied threats, to place their
children with relatives or friends. Because of the frequency with
which this practice occurs, it is important for Minnesota lawyers to
understand the application of the ICWA to a variety of placements
deemed "voluntary." Voluntary proceedings are those which in-
volve a voluntary placement of a child with someone other than
the parents, usually only temporarily, or which are a parent's vol-
untary termination of parental rights to a child.129
The ICWA contains its own section on voluntary placements
which imposes a number of requirements on voluntary proceed-
ings.130 Section 1913(a) provides that a parent or Indian custo-
dian's consent to a foster care placement or termination of
parental rights must be in writing and recorded before a district
court judge, and may not be given within ten days after the child's
birth. The judge must certify that a) the terms and consequences
of the consent were fully explained and understood by the parent
125. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988); MINN. STAT. § 257.351, subd. 3 (1990).
126. The Indian Family Preservation Act specifically includes status prosecu-
tions. See MINN. STAT. § 257.351, subd. 3 (1990); MDHS Regulations, supra note 74,
at XIII-3514. While the ICWA does not specifically include or exclude status prose-
cutions, the language in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988) is "an act which, if committed by
an adult, would be deemed a crime." By definition, status offenses are those that
only a child can commit, for none are illegal conduct for an adult. Minnesota law
treats status offenses as non-delinquent conduct, MINN. STATS. §§ 260.015, subds.
5(a), 19-23 & 260.195 (1990). The Ramsey County Juvenile Court held in 1986 that
status prosecutions are subject to the ICWA. In re R.G.B., File 84-D-0298 (Minn.
Juv. Ct. 1986). The BIA Guidelines specifically apply the ICWA to juvenile status
proceedings. See BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67587.
127. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988); MINN. STAT. § 257.351, subd. 3 (1990); BIA Guide-
lines, supra note 73, at 67587; MDHS Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3514.
128. This conclusion is based upon implication of the language "or upon an
award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to one of the parents." 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)
(1988)(emphasis added). See MDHS Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3514
(agreeing with this conclusion).
129. MINN. STAT. §§ 257.071, 260.221, subd. 1(a) (1990).
130. 25 U.S.C. § 1913 (1990).
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or Indian custodian;131 and b) the parent or Indian custodian un-
derstood the explanation in English or that it was interpreted into
a language the parent or Indian custodian understood. Section
1913(b) permits the parent or Indian custodian to withdraw con-
sent to a foster care placement at any time. If a parent or Indian
custodian withdraws consent, the child must be returned.
In proceedings for voluntary termination of parental rights
and adoptive placements, the parent's consent may be withdrawn
for any reason at any time prior to the entry of the court's final
decree of termination and adoption.I3 2 Within two years of a final
decree of adoption, the parent may still withdraw consent and pe-
tition to vacate the decree if the consent was obtained by fraud or
duress. Any state's law which permits such an action after more
than two years continues to be valid under the ICWA. If the court
determines that the consent was obtained through fraud or duress,
it must vacate the decree and return the child to its parent.133
The legislative history of section 1913 notes that Congress did
not intend to prohibit a state welfare agency from commencing an
involuntary proceeding (CHIPS or termination of parental rights),
when consent to a foster care placement or termination of parental
rights has been withdrawn under section 1913 (b), (c) and (d). 134
State courts across the country are divided on the issue of
whether the ICWA applies in any respect other than the section
1913 requirements to voluntary proceedings.I35
Section 1913 itself contains none of the notice and other pro-
cedural and placement requirements found elsewhere in the
ICWA. That fact, together with its use of the terms "foster care
placement," "termination of parental rights," and "adoptive place-
ment," which are the predicates for application of the rest of the
ICWA, suggests that the ICWA notice, procedural and placement
requirements apply to any voluntary proceedings which meet the
definitions of "foster care placement," "termination of parental
rights," and "adoptive placement."
131. Minnesota has a similar requirement. MiNN. STAT. § 257.071, subd. 1 (1990).
132. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c) (1988).
133. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(d) (1988).
134. House Report, supra note 14, at 23. In our experience, this commonly
occurs.
135. See, e.g., D.E.D. v. State, 704 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Alaska 1985); Catholic Social
Servs. v. C.A.A., 783 P.2d 1159, 1160 (Alaska 1989); Sayers v. Beltrami County, 472
N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), reversed on other ground.% 481 N.W.2d 547
(Minn. 1992)(dictum). But see Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v, Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30, 50 n.25 (1989)(Congress intended the ICWA to reach voluntary place-
ments); In re K.L.R.F., 515 A.2d 33, 36-38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal dismissed,




Those courts which have held that the ICWA does not apply
to voluntary proceedings emphasize the section 1903(1)(i) defini-
tion of "foster care placement," a placement in which "the parent
or Indian custodian cannot have the child returned on de-
mand ... ."136 They hold that, since a parent can have a child in a
voluntary placement returned on demand, a voluntary placement
is not covered by the ICWA's notice and placement requirements.
These decisions point to the fact that the ICWA's notice provision
limits its requirements to an "involuntary proceeding,"1 37 a term
not defined elsewhere in the ICWA. A preliminary portion of the
BIA Guidelines supports this view, stating, "[v]oluntary place-
ments which do not operate to prohibit the child's parent or Indian
custodian from regaining custody of the child at any time are not
covered by the [ICWA]."138 The problem with the view adopted by
these cases is that it essentially treats section 1913 as an orphaned
provision which need not be enforced; those cases which hold that
none of the ICWA's notice and placement provisions apply to vol-
untary placements are misguided. First, this restrictive view ex-
cludes from ICWA purview even voluntary proceedings under
section 1913. If Congress intended that the ICWA's definition of
"foster care placements" should operate to exclude from the
ICWA's protections all voluntary placements and other voluntary
proceedings, it would have said so and would not have enacted sec-
tion 1913.
Second, a view that applies the restrictive view of "foster care
placements" to exclude all voluntary proceedings from the ICWA's
protections essentially nullifies section 1913. Such a result is cer-
tainly inconsistent with the canon of statutory construction which
demands liberal interpretation of statutes designed to benefit na-
tive people.139 This is contrary to the purposes of the ICWA,
which are to restore to Indian tribes the right to make their own
determinations as to the placements of their members and
136. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i) (1988). See, e.g., In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 176
(Kan. 1982); D.E.D. v. State, 704 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Alaska 1985). Much of the litiga-
tion under 25 U.S.C. § 1913 (1988) concerns the timing of a parent's withdrawal of a
voluntary termination. In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d 10, 13-14 (Alaska 1984); B.R.T. v. So-
cial Servs. Bd., 391 N.W.2d 594, 599 (N.D. 1986); In re Kiogima, 472 N.W.2d 13, 14-16
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 952 (1992).
137. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988); see, e.g., Catholic Social Servs. v. C.A.A., 783 P.2d
1159, 1160 (Alaska 1989).
138. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67587; voluntary placements are not done
before a judge in Hennepin County.
139. See cases cited supra note 85 and In re K.L.R.F., 515 A.2d 33, 37 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1986), appeal dismissed, 533 A.2d 708 (Pa. 1987). It is also inconsistent with
Minnesota's canon of statutory construction that every law must be construed to
give effect to all of its provisions. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1990).
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relatives.140
Third, the courts that read sections 1903(1)(i) and 1913 to
hold that no voluntary proceedings are subject to the ICWA's re-
quirements necessarily exclude any right of notice to the tribe and
thus tribal intervention. Both notice and intervention are re-
garded as significant to fulfillment of the ICWA's purposes: tribal
adjudication of child care disputes and tribal placement of children
needing placement. The ICWA's rights of tribal intervention and
of involvement in placements141 are meaningless unless the tribe
is notified that a child is being placed.'
42
There is and should be recognized a distinction between the
two types of voluntary placements, for purposes of ICWA applica-
bility. It is one thing for a mother to call her sister and ask her to
care for her son temporarily. It is quite another thing for a
mother to be confronted by an agency social worker who comes to
her home with a police officer and says, "Sign this voluntary place-
ment or I will pick up your son and we'll see you next week in ju-
venile court." The latter, unfortunately, is a scenario enacted daily
in Hennepin County since the agency began reducing non-relative
out-of-home placements several years ago.
The former is a purely private, temporary placement, to
which it appears that even section 1913 of the ICWA is inapplica-
ble. The commentary to the BIA Guidelines agrees.143 The latter
situation is really an involuntary proceeding because if the parent
seeks to rescind or fails to comply with the agency's demand for
the placement, the agency will file an involuntary petition immedi-
ately. Since this type of placement is in reality involuntary, the
notice, intervention, and placement sections of the ICWA should
apply.X44
140. In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 932 (N.J. 1988).
It is also contrary to the United States Supreme Court's observation that Congress
intended for the ICWA to apply to voluntary placements, Mississippi Band of Choc-
taw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 50 n.25 (1989).
141. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1988).
142. Barsh, supra note 14, at 1312-13; see generally Carver, supra note 14 at 335,
347 (discussing the importance of the early tribal intervention in voluntary place-
ments which is provided for in the Indian Family Preservation Act).
143. "The Act also excludes from its coverage any placements that do not de-
prive the parents.. .of the right to regain custody of the child upon demand. With-
out this exception.. .[c]ourt appearances would also be required for many informal
caretaking arrangements that Indian parents. . .sometimes make for their chil-
dren." BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67588.
144. As to the "voluntary but not really voluntary" distinction, see Carver, supra
note 14 at 337. As to whether the notice, intervention and placement sections of
the ICWA should apply to this type of placement, see In re K.L.R.F., 515 A.2d 33,
36-37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal dismissed, 533 A.2d 708 (Pa. 1987); Lisa Mc-
Naughton, The Indian Child Welfare Act "Voluntary Terminations": The Act Must
1992]
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The Indian Family Preservation Act explicitly adopts this
view, and calls for notice to the tribe even before a parent is likely
to be asked to place a child, as well as notice of actual out-of-home
placements, voluntary and involuntary.145 Under the Indian Fam-
ily Preservation Act, local agency involvement is assumed in a vol-
untary placement, which by definition assumes that the child and
the parent will be reunited. 46 The Indian Family Preservation
Act also provides a mechanism for a parent to rescind a voluntary
placement, and demand the return of the child which is similar to
section 1913(b) of the ICWA.i47
A Minnesota lawyer should be guided by the Indian Family
Preservation Act when a voluntary placement is at issue. It pro-
vides better, and more certain, legal rights to native people on this
point than does the ICWA. Given the national uncertainty con-
cerning the ICWA's applicability to voluntary proceedings, the In-
dian Family Preservation Act should therefore control over the
ICWA.148
B. Which Parties?
1. Which Indian Children
The ICWA's protections apply to those Indian children who
are unmarried, under eighteen years of age, and either a member
of a tribe or eligible for membership in a tribe and a biological
child of a member.4 9 The Indian Family Preservation Act con-
tains the same definition, but without the requirement that a child
be a biological child of a member.150
The BIA Guidelines and the MDHS Regulations provide that,
when a court has reason to believe that a child involved in a pro-
ceeding before it is an Indian child, the court or the local welfare
agency must seek verification from either the tribe or the Bureau
Be Applied (unpublished manuscript, on file with LAW & INEQUALITY). The Indian
Family Preservation Act explicitly adopts this view. See MINN. STATS. §§ 257.352-
257.353 and Carver, supra note 14 at 34548.
145. MINN. STAT. §§ 257.352-257.353 (1990). See generally Carver, supra note 14.
146. MINN. STAT. § 257.351, subd. 17 (1990); In re K.L.R.F., 515 A.2d 33, 36-37 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986), appeal dismissed, 533 A.2d 708 (Pa. 1987)(emphasis on temporary
nature of placement).
147. The MDHS Regulations extensively regulate this type of placement.
MDHS Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3530 to -3543.
148. Because of 25 U.S.C. § 1921 (1988), use of the Indian Family Preservation
Act instead of the ICWA in this situation does not create a Supremacy Clause prob-
lem; see supra text accompanying notes 92-98. See also Carver, supra note 14 at
334-38.
149. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1988); MDHS Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-
3513(6). See In re M.M.O., No. C6-89-1598 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 1990).
150. MINN. STAT. § 257.351, subd. 6 (1990).
[Vol. 10:311
1992] INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
of Indian Affairs.151 The Indian Family Preservation Act requires
a court to determine whether a child is an Indian child,152 and im-
poses upon the welfare agency the duty of seeking verification of
Indian status, whether or not the court is involved.lS3 We believe
that state law, including the "reasonable efforts" law, requires the
welfare agency to assist in enrolling a child in its tribe.154 Both
sets of regulations list indicia of whether a child might be an In-
dian.155 Whether a child is a member of a tribe is a decision made
by the tribe, and the BIA Guidelines make that determination con-
clusive.156 Most Minnesota tribes require that a prospective en-
rollee have at least 25 percent Indian blood. A lawyer
representing a native parent may sometimes have to provide infor-
mation to the tribe concerning her relatives, particularly if the rel-
atives were themselves not enrolled. Absent a contrary
determination by the tribe, the BIA's conclusion as to whether or
not a child is an Indian child is conclusive.157
The enrollment or membership determination occurs prior
to, or contemporaneously with, the initiation of the proceeding in
juvenile court. At this point, it is not too late for a lawyer to assist
the native parent with enrollment. However, a number of deci-
sions in other states have held that an adjudication or placement
decision is not subject to collateral attack under section 1914 when,
after the adjudication, a party became enrolled in an effort to ap-
ply ICWA requirements, to a completed proceeding.15
151. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67586; MDHS Regulations, supra note 74,
at XIII-3522.
152. MINN. STAT. § 257.354, subd. 2 (1990).
153. MINN. STAT. § 257.352, subd. 1 (1990).
154. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.012(b); 256F.07, subd. 3a (1990).
155. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67586; MDHS Regulations, supra note 74,
at XIII-3522.
156. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67586. But see In re Adoption of a Child
of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 933 (N.J. 1988), in which the court suggested that
if a tribe's refusal to enroll a child is based upon an incomplete ancestry, such a
decision would not be determinative of the child's eligibility for treatment under
the ICWA based upon its actual ancestry. Most regional tribes make membership
determinations according to the prospective enrollee's percentage of Indian blood.
In a few cases, that percentage must be of the prospective enrolling tribe. See Tri-
bal Court Chart, appended. See also People ex rel. J.J., 454 N.W.2d 317, 327-28 (S.D.
1990), which holds that, under § 25 U.S.C. 1911(d) (1988), the Full Faith and Credit
provision, a state trial court must defer to a tribe's determination that it, and not
another tribe, is the child's tribe.
157. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67586.
158. Dep't of Social Servs. v. Johanson, 402 N.W.2d 13, 15-16 (Mich. Ct. App.
1986); In re Infant Boy Crews, 803 P.2d 24, 29-30 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). Minnesota
courts might not take the same position. In In re B.W., 454 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990), the court of appeals reversed a termination of parental rights and di-
rected the trial court on remand to permit a change in B.W.'s enrollment so that he
would be considered for placement with tribal relatives.
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The ICWA, the BIA Guidelines and the MDHS Regulations
all have provisions concerning children who are members of more
than one tribe.159 When that occurs, the trial court must deter-
mine which tribe is the child's tribe, based upon several factors,
one of which is the tribe with the more significant contact. 60 The
Indian Family Preservation Act agrees.16' A tribe is defined for
the purposes of ICWA eligibility as one recognized as eligible for
the services provided Indians by the Department of the Interior,
including Alaskan native villages. The Indian Family Preservation
Act agrees.162 Under that definition, members of Canadian Indian
tribes are not covered by the ICWA.163
2. Which Indian Parents or Custodians?
The ICWA defines a parent as a biological parent or parents
of an Indian child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted
an Indian child under tribal law or custom.'6 4 The Indian Family
Preservation Act adopts this same definition.16 5 Under both stat-
utes, an unwed father who has neither acknowledged paternity
nor been found to be the father is not a parent and is not eligible
for the statutes' benefits.166 The cases which have considered the
issue hold that the paternity determination is one that is made ac-
cording to state law or tribal law and custom. 167 The BIA Guide-
lines contain no commentary on this section, and the MDHS
Regulations merely specify that a parent does not have to be mar-
159. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(5)(b) (1988); BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67586-87;
MDHS Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3523, -3571.
160. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67586; MDHS Regulations, supra note 74,
at XIII-3571. See also People ex rel J.J., 454 N.W.2d 317, 327 (S.D. 1990).
161. MINN. STAT. § 257.351, subd. 7 (1990). The Indian Family Preservation Act
diverges from the implementation of the ICWA by permitting any Indian tribe ex-
pressing an interest in the child and in which the child could be enrolled to act as
the child's tribe if the child's legitimate tribe does not express an interest.
162. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (1988); MINN. STAT. § 257.351, subd. 9 (1990). See, e.g., In
re M.C.P., 571 A.2d 627, 632-34 & nn.2-3 (Vt. 1989).
163. In re Wanomi P., 264 Cal. Rptr. 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), cert denied, 111
S.Ct. 57 (1990); In re Stiarwalt, 546 N.E.2d 44 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989), cert denied, 550
N.E.2d 564 (Ill. 1990).
164. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (1988). Regarding the status of an adoptive parent, see
In re K.L.R.F., 515 A.2d 33, 36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal dismissed, 533 A.2d 708
(Pa. 1987).
165. MINN. STAT. § 257.351, subd. 11 (1990).
166. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (1988); MINN. STAT. § 257.351, subd. 11 (1990); In re Ap-
peal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 667 P.2d 228, 232-33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983);
In re Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla. 1985), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1072
(1988); In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 933-36 (N.J.
1988). A person who is not a "parent" has no standing to attack a placement under
25 U.S.C. § 1914. Id. at 937.
167. See In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d at 935.
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ried to assert rights under the law.168
A custodian is defined in the ICWA as an "Indian person who
has legal custody of an Indian child under tribal law or custom or
under State law, or to whom temporary physical care, custody and
control has been transferred by the parent."169 The Indian Family
Preservation Act contains the same definition.170
V. Tribal Court Jurisdiction v. State Court Jurisdiction: How Is This
Determined?
A. Notice
Before any CHIPS or termination petition can be heard in
state court, and assuming that there is some indication that an In-
dian child is at issue,171 the agency must provide notice to the par-
ent or custodian and the child's tribe. The notice must be by
registered mail, return receipt requested.172 The proceeding may
not take place until at least ten days after the parent or custodian
and the tribe receive notice.17 3 Upon receipt, these parties must be
given an additional twenty days to prepare upon request.174 If the
parents or custodian and the tribe cannot be identified, notice
must then be given to the Secretary of the Interior by registered
mail, who then has fifteen days to provide notice to the parties.1
75
168. MDHS Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3513(12).
169. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(6) (1988); In re Bird Head, 331 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Neb. 1983).
A person who has custody of children by a grant of custody from a court may not
be an "Indian custodian" within the meaning of the ICWA. People ex reL. J.J., 454
N.W.2d 317, 327 (S.D. 1990); State ex. reL Juvenile Dep't of Multnomah County v.
England, 640 P.2d 608, 613 (Or. 1982).
170. MINN. STAT. § 257.351, subd. 8 (1990). The BIA Guidelines are silent on this
definition and the MDHS Regulations add no substantive comment. MDHS Regu-
lations, supra note 74, at XIII-3513(8).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 152-56.
172. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988).
173. Id. In our experience of eight years practice under the ICWA in Hennepin
County, the juvenile court has not followed this provision with regard to health and
welfare hold hearings. If one takes the position that such hearings are covered by
the ICWA, see note 120, the advance notice and other ICWA requirements should
apply. Although neither the ICWA nor the Indian Family Preservation Act say so,
an alternative position is that the first health and welfare hold hearing, shortly af-
ter the child is picked up, is a summary hearing to be followed by a formal deten-
tion hearing, see MINN. R. Juv. P. 52.04, subd. 2, at which ICWA requirements
apply. Those who take this position point out that some health and welfare hold
petitions are not granted by the juvenile court at the summary hearing, meaning
that such children are returned right away, and imposing the ICWA's formal re-
quirements could prolong the separation for those families. The legislative history
noted that some Indian parents do not want long periods after notice before the
case begins. House Report, supra note 14, at 32.
174. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988).
175. Id.
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The BIA Guidelines provide that personal service is also ac-
ceptable, since it is superior to mailed service, and therefore pro-
vides better protection for the rights the ICWA is designed to
enforce. 176 Other forms of substitute service, such as published
notice,177 and lesser forms of mailed service are improper, notwith-
standing a recent unpublished decision of the court of appeals.
7 8
The 1989 "reasonable efforts" legislation added to Minnesota law
the registered mail minimum requirement.1
79
The cases diverge on the issue of what is the effect of im-
proper or no notice. Some cases hold that improper notice or
other procedural improprieties do not invalidate subsequent pro-
ceedings. Others hold that notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite
which, when improper, requires invalidation of subsequent pro-
ceedings. 8 0 The !CWA itself suggests that the latter view is cor-
rect, because it contains a section which authorizes collateral
attack on proceedings violating section 1912, which contains the
notice requirement.'18
The BIA Guidelines and the MDHS Regulations specify the
176. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67588-89. The 1989 "reasonable efforts"
law allows personal service, MINN. STAT. § 260.141 (1990). See also In re M.E.B.,
Nos. C6-90-2370, C6-90-2388 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1991)(personal service permis-
sible as superior method).
177. In re L.A.M., 727 P.2d 1057 (Alaska 1986) holds that published notice is not
permissible under the ICWA, particularly where, as in that case, the agency knew
how to reach the parties.
178. The Minnesota Court of Appeals recently approved notice to the tribe by
first-class mail in circumstances where the tribe was already aware of the proceed-
ings. In re V.R., No. C2-90-1765 (Minn. Ct. App. April 2,1991). This holding is not
only improper under the ICWA, but also violates state law. MINN. STAT. § 260.141,
subd. 2a (1990). Moreover, it relies upon a South Dakota decision which has not
been followed in subsequent cases by that same court. Compare In re S.Z., 325
N.W.2d 53, 55-56 (S.D. 1982) with In re N.A.H., 418 N.W.2d 310, 311 (S.D. 1988); see
also In re D.M.J., 741 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Okla. 1985)(first-class mail notice permissible
when tribe had actual notice and participated); In re H.D., 729 P.2d 1234, 1240-41
(Kan. Ct. App. 1986)(no notice).
179. MINN. STAT. § 260.141, subd. 2a (1990).
180. Compare In re M.E.M., 679 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Mont. 1984), D.E.D. v. State, 704
P.2d 774, 782 (Alaska 1985) and In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 606 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986)(procedural failings are not jurisdictional) with In re N.A.H., 418 N.W.2d 310,
311 (S.D. 1988) and In re M.C.P., 571 A.2d 627, 634 (Vt. 1989)(procedural failings are
jurisdictional).
181. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1988). See In re H.D., 729 P.2d 1234, 1240-41 (Kan. Ct. App.
1986)(violation of the Indian Child Welfare Act notice provisions may be cause for
invalidation of the proceedings under 25 U.S.C. § 1914). See also MDHS Regula-
tions, supra note 74, at XIII-3594. Section 1914 also permits collateral attacks for
violations of §§ 25 U.S.C. 1911 and 1913, but not for improper health and welfare
hold hearings followed by procedurally-proper adjudicatory hearings. In re M.E.M.,
679 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Mont. 1984).
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particular information which must be included in the notice.
8 2
While their requirements are not identical, both demand that the
notice include significant information about the child, its family,
its tribe, the type of proceeding, and information about interven-
tion and representation by appointed counsel. 8 3 Both regulatory
schemes provide a detailed summary of the required time peri-
ods.i 84 A Minnesota lawyer should always ensure at the health
and welfare hold hearing that the agency has complied with the
notice provisions.
The notice and other requirements of section 1912 and the
placement preferences of section 1915 are to be applied not only at
the initial placement proceedings, but also any time a child is
moved between foster placements. 8 5 Hennepin County has not, in
our experience, followed this latter provision of the ICWA when
changing placements.
B. Transfer to Tribal Court From State Court
1. ICWA Presumes Transfer to Tribal Court
Recent decisions make it clear that Congress, by enacting the
ICWA, intended that tribal courts be the preferred forum for adju-
dicating native childrens' placement decisions in child protection
matters. 88 Section 1911(b) of the ICWA, according to the United
States Supreme Court, creates a system which presumes transfer
to tribal court. 8 7 Under section 1911(b), a proceeding for foster
care placement or termination of parental rights involving a child
not domiciled or residing upon the reservation shall be transferred
to tribal court, absent good cause to the contrary, if either parent,
the Indian custodian or the tribe requests. 8 8 The request can be
182. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67588-89; MDHS Regulations, supra note
74, at XIII-3561.
183. Id.
184. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67589; MDHS Regulations, suspra note 74,
at XIII-3562.
185. 25 U.S.C. § 1916(b) (1988); BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67595; MDHS
Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3592. None of the state statutes discussed here
appear to address this issue.
186. In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 635 P.2d 187, 188-89 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982)(only if a parent objects, the tribal
court declines, or there is 'good cause' not to transfer the proceeding, may this re-
ferral jurisdiction be prevented); In re Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 970 (Utah
1986)(ICWA designates tribal court as the exclusive forum); In re T.R.M., 525
N.E.2d 298, 305 (Ind. 1988)(tribal jurisdiction unless the state court finds good
cause).
187. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30, 36, 49 (1989).
188. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988)(emphasis supplied). The BIA Guidelines use the
mandatory term "the court must transfer." BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at
1992]
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oral or written. 8 9
2. Tribe Or Parent May Decline Transfer
The tribe can decline, and many tribes have done so, for rea-
sons relating to distance and expense or to enrollment and mem-
bership questions.190 Either parent may object to the transfer,191
and there must be a hearing at which the parent can participate.1
92
Such an objection by either parent is conclusive-when a parent
objects, the case will stay in state court. 93
There are a number of reasons which might cause a parent to
object to transfer to tribal court. A principal objection might be
the distance between the parent's residence and the reservation.194
67590. The Indian Family Preservation Act contains the same language, MINN.
STAT. § 257.354, subd. 3 (1990), and the MDHS Regulations, although using as well
the mandatory term "shall transfer," add nothing to the federal standards discussed
in this section. MDHS Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3573. See In re B.W., 454
N.W.2d 437, 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)(transfer is mandated by ICWA whenever
possible).
189. The BIA Guidelines permit oral requests to transfer, although the ICWA it-
self is silent. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67590. The Indian Family Preser-
vation Act is silent on the type of request to transfer, MINN. STAT. § 257.354, subd. 3
(1990), as are the MDHS Regulations. See, e.g., In re Laurie R., 760 P.2d 1295, 1299
(N.M. Ct. App. 1988)(oral request permitted).
190. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1990). The BIA Guidelines recommend that the tribe
be given twenty days to answer a request for transfer, and that it should inform the
trial court, either orally or in writing, as to its decision. BIA Guidelines, supra note
73, at 67592. The MDHS Regulations merely state that the tribal court's refusal to
accept a transfer is acceptable. MDHS Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3573.
See, e.g., In re Wayne R.N., 757 P.2d 1333, 1335 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988)(policy against
transfers when all parties and evidence in another state); People ex reL J.J., 454
N.W.2d 317, 319 (S.D. 1990)(transfer declined because of ineligibility for member-
ship); In re J.L.M., 451 N.W.2d 377, 384-86 (Neb. 1990)(same). Tribes will more
often decline intervention into state court proceedings, under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c),
than transfers to tribal court, for these reasons. See, e.g., In re Adoption of a Child
of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 930 (N.J. 1988)(enrollment and financial restric-
tions); In re Shawboose, 438 N.W.2d 272, 273-74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)(enrollment
restriction); In re Robert T., 246 Cal. Rptr. 168, 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)("we don't
intervene unless we're asked"). Waivers of intervention rights under § 1911(c)
must be specific and will not be implied. In re Q.G.M., 808 P.2d 684, 689 (Okla.
1991).
191. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988).
192. In re G.L.O.C., 668 P.2d 235 (Mont. 1983).
193. See In re R.I., 402 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)(parental objection
is conclusive, trial court has no discretion to transfer to tribal court over parent's
objection); In re C.C.T.L., No. C3-88-253 (Minn. Ct. App. May 31, 1988).
194. This is a particular concern for native people residing in Minneapolis and
St. Paul. The Red Lake reservation is about five hours away, and reservations of
other regional tribes whose members reside in the urban areas are a much greater
distance. The Cheyenne River Lakota reservation, for example, is about twelve
hours away, the Devil's Lake Lakota reservation is not less than eight hours, and
the Standing Rock Lakota reservation is perhaps sixteen hours away.
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A second objection might be one based on reservation politics.195
A third objection might be based upon the finality of the tribal
court transfer decision. Once a child becomes a domiciliary of the
reservation, and a ward of the tribal court, the tribal court's juris-
diction is exclusive.196
Moreover, most tribal court child placement decisions are cer-
tainly immune from collateral attack in state court1 97, and are
probably immune from collateral attack in federal court.198 The
tribal court itself is immune from suit in federal court, although its
members and the individual administrators may not be.'99 Re-
gional federal courts are divided over whether federal habeas
corpus relief is available under either the general federal habeas
corpus statute or the Indian Civil Rights Act and its habeas provi-
sion in an attack upon a tribal court's child placement decisions.200
No federal habeas relief, even if available, can be obtained unless
tribal court appellate remedies are exhausted. 20 ' A lawyer should
be sure to explore these issues with a native parent who is consid-
ering a transfer to tribal court.
3. Timing Of Transfer Request
The ICWA itself gives no indication concerning when the re-
quest for transfer to tribal court must be made.20 2 However, the
195. See generally Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis on the 1968 In-
dian Civil Rights Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 557, 577 (1972); David H. Getches and
Charles F. Wilkinson, Federal Indian Law: Cases and Materials 367-68 (2d ed.
1986).
196. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1988). But see text accompanying notes 318-20. Nor will
tribal court jurisdiction be exclusive if the child is not on the reservation and the
court finds that the ICWA does not apply (i.e., for reasons relating to membership,
paternity, etc.).
197. There appears to be no state court remedy for mounting a collateral attack
upon an order of a tribal court, and the only proceeding which attempted to do so
in a Minnesota court, which was based upon the ICWA, was unsuccessful. In re
C.C.T.L., No. C3-88-253 (Minn. Ct. App. May 31, 1988)(based upon 25 U.S.C. § 1922
(1988)).
198. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). Our research does not
agree with the suggestion made in Carver, supra note 14, at 351-52, that the federal
courts are readily available for collateral attacks upon tribal court decisions. See
cases cited infra at notes 199-201.
199. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59. See DeMent v. Oglala Sioux
Tribal Ct., 874 F.2d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 1989).
200. The general federal habeas corpus statutes providing for federal court relief
from state and federal criminal confinements are found at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255
(1988). The Indian Civil Rights Act has its own habeas provision, 25 U.S.C. § 1303
(1988). Compare Wells v. Philbrick, 486 F.Supp. 807 (D.S.D. 1980) and Weatherwax
v. Fairbanks, 619 F.Supp. 294 (D. Mont. 1985) with DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal
Ct., 874 F.2d 510.
201. DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Ct., 874 F.2d at 516-17.
202. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988).
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BIA Guidelines suggest that the request should be made
"promptly after receiving notice of the hearing."20 3 The BIA
Guidelines discuss at some length the problems which can be cre-
ated by late requests for transfer to tribal court but also suggest
that the disruptive effect upon the litigation which would result
from a late transfer request should make the agency more diligent
in providing proper notice of the proceedings.20 4 The BIA Guide-
lines also point out that transfer requests do not have to be
granted, and that a request for transfer made after the trial is un-
derway is properly denied if it was deliberately delayed.
205
4. Good Cause Not To Transfer
(i) ICWA And Legislative History
Aside from an objection by a parent, section 1911(b) suggests
only one other reason why a case should not be transferred to tri-
bal court. This is the existence of good cause to the contrary. The
BIA Guidelines place the burden of establishing good cause to the
contrary on the party opposing transfer, by at least clear and con-
vincing evidence, because of the congressional policy advanced in
the ICWA of making tribal court determinations the preferred
course.2
6
The legislative history of the ICWA makes clear that Con-
gress intended that the good cause to the contrary permitted by
section 1911(b) must benefit the Indian litigant.2 07 The part of sec-
203. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67590.
204. Id.
205. Id However, in In re B.W., 454 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), the re-
quest for transfer to the tribal court was sent by facsimile machine from the fa-
ther's tribe to the mother's tribe on the first day of trial. The administration of the
father's tribe had changed in the three months between the first notice the agency
provided and the trial, and the new administration decided to seek transfer.
Although the court of appeals reversed the termination, it did not specifically re-
verse the trial court's decision to deny the transfer request. It strongly suggested,
however, that the lateness of the request was not alone enough reason to deny the
transfer. I& at 446. But see In re Wayne R.N., 757 P.2d 1333, 1335-36 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1988)(request to transfer made on morning of trial too late); In re Robert T.,
246 Cal. Rptr. 168, 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)(request to transfer should at least pre-
cede permanency planning stage of CHIPS proceeding). See generally In re A.L.,
442 N.W.2d 233, 236-37 (S.D. 1989); People ex reL J.J., 454 N.W.2d 317, 328-31 (S.D.
1990).
206. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67591. See also MDHS Regulations, supra
note 74, at XIII-3573; In re R.R.R., 763 P.2d 94, 101 (Okla. 1988). With regard to the
burden which must be met to oppose transfer, see, e.g., In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313,
1317 (Mont. 1981)(clear and convincing evidence).
207. "The subsection is intended to permit a State court to apply a modified doc-
trine of forum non conveniens, in appropriate cases, to insure that the rights of the
child as an Indian, the Indian parents or custodian, and the tribe are fully pro-
tected." House Report, supra note 14, at 21.
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tion 1911(b) which permits a state trial court to refuse a request
for transfer to a tribal court for good cause has been the subject of
extensive commentary in the BIA Guidelines and a large number
of state court cases.
(ii) BIA Guidelines
The BIA Guidelines contain only one factor which will al-
ways constitute good cause to the contrary. That is the absence of
a tribal court.20 8 They also point out one factor which will never
be good cause to the contrary, namely the state court's perception
of socio-economic conditions on the reservation, and the adequacy
of the tribal court system and its social services mechanism.2 09
One good cause factor - the best interests of the child - ap-
pears in a great many cases which discuss section 1911(b), but is
not mentioned anywhere in the ICWA, the BIA Guidelines or in
the Minnesota cases, statutes and regulations discussed to this
point. Courts in other states are at odds over whether good cause
to the contrary is shown if transfer to tribal court would be con-
trary to the appellate court's perception of the child's best inter-
ests. 210 We believe that the preservation of a child's relationship
with its tribe is always in the child's best interests.21 ' Other com-
mon best interests concerns, such as the type of foster placement,
the child's bonding with its present family, or the psychological ef-
fects of a change in placement are properly seen as post-transfer
issues which relate to ultimate placement. They do not relate to
the separate, jurisdictional issue of whether the transfer should be
granted.2 ' 2 The BIA Guidelines support this view by stating that
socio-economic conditions on the reservation and the adequacy of
208. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67591.
209. Id. See also MDHS Regulations, supra note 74 at XIII-3573; In re Armell,
550 N.E.2d 1060, 1065, (Ill Ct. App.), appeal denied, 555 N.E.2d 374, (Ill.), cert. de-
nied, 111 S.Ct. 345 (1990).
210. Compare In re T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 307-308 (Ind. 1988); Chester County
Dep't of Social Servs. v. Coleman, 372 S.E.2d 912, 915 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988), reversed
on other grounds, 399 S.E.2d 773 (S.C. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S.Ct. 2017 (1991); In re
Robert T., 246 Cal. Rptr. 168, 174-75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d
1313, 1317 (Mont. 1981); In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 869 (Okla. 1988) and In re T.S., 801
P.2d 77, 80-81 (Mont. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S.Ct. 2013 (1991) with In re Armell, 550
N.E.2d at 1064-66; In re C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105, 117-18 (Neb. 1992).
211. In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 635 P.2d 187, 189 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
212. In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d at 1064-66. While the best interests standard has
always been an important consideration in Minnesota cases, the legislature in 1990
specifically ordered that a native child's best interests must be determined consist-
ently with the ICWA and the Indian Family Preservation Act, MINN. STAT.
§ 260.011, subd. 2. See In re M.T.S., - N.W.2d - (Minn. Ct. App. September 15,
1992) (best interests standard preempted by ICWA).
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the tribal court and its social services mechanism are not, in fact,
good cause.
21 3
The BIA Guidelines establish four discretionary factors
which may, on the facts of each case, suggest that there exists good
cause to the contrary.2 14 Those four factors are:
- the party seeking the transfer to tribal court did not file the
request to transfer promptly after receiving notice of the
hearing, and the proceeding was at an advanced stage when
the request to transfer was received; (this factor is directly
related to the timeliness factor the BIA discusses two guide-
lines earlier);
215
- the child is over twelve and objects to the transfer;
- the child is over five, its parents are not available, and the
child has had little contact with the tribe or its members;
the BIA points out that, when the parents are unavailable,
state judges should not make determinations about the ex-
tent of a child's contact with its tribe, and that, although
parents can usually be expected to make such a determina-
tion, this guideline is for the benefit of those young children
who are effectively or actually orphaned;216
- the evidence necessary to decide the case could not be ade-
quately presented in tribal court without undue hardship to
the parties or witnesses.
This last of these four factors has been the most extensively
discussed by the commentary to the BIA Guidelines217 and in the
state court cases.
The commentary to the BIA Guidelines explicitly adopts the
discussion in the legislative history,218 and concludes that this
fourth factor was designed only for the convenience of the Indian
litigant.219 Notwithstanding this clear statement of the Guide-
lines, there are a number of cases which decline transfer to tribal
court because of inconvenience to the county welfare agency, the
foster parents, and the witnesses.220 These cases flatly misinter-
pret the Guidelines and completely misunderstand the whole pur-
213. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67591.
214. Id. The MDHS Regulations are the same. MDHS Regulations, supra note
74, at XIII-3573.
215. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67591; see supra text accompanying notes
202-205.
216. Id. Cases on this point include In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d at 1065 (lack of
contact between young child and tribe not a reason not to transfer because tribe has
transcendent interest in developing relationship with its members); People ex reL
J.J., 454 N.W.2d 317, 329 (S.D. 1990)(lack of contact with tribe justifies failure to
transfer); In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77, 82 (Mont. 1990), cert denied, Ill S.Ct. 2013
(1991)(lack of contact proper factor in considering transfer).
217. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67591.
218. House Report, supra note 14, at 21.
219. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67591.
220. See infra cases cited in notes 221-23.
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pose of the ICWA, as recently stated by the United States Supreme
Court in the Mississippi Choctaw case.
(iii) Cases On Good Cause
Typical of the cases which refuse to transfer to tribal court
based upon inconvenience to the welfare agency is In re N.L. 221 In
this case, an Oklahoma trial court refused to transfer a case to tri-
bal court because the tribal court was located in one county and
the witnesses and parties were located in another county in the
same state.222 While greater distances have been at issue in some
of the state decisions which deny transfer to tribal court,22 3 there
is nothing in the ICWA, its legislative history, or its implementing
regulations which suggests that inconvenience to state agency wit-
nesses should be dispositive.
Aside from the fact that the legislative history specifically
suggests that transfer to tribal court should be refused only for in-
convenience to Indian litigants,224 there are two principal
problems with the cases which refuse to transfer for reasons re-
lated to state agency convenience. First, the purpose of the ICWA
was to remove outmoded geographical concepts such as residence
and domicile from the law of child custody jurisdiction, and re-
place them with a "jurisdictional standard based on the ethnic ori-
gin of the child."225 Second, those cases which adopt the
221. 754 P.2d 863 (Okla. 1988).
222. Id. at 869 (the two counties were less than 200 miles apart). See also In re
Bird Head, 331 N.W.2d 785, 790 (Neb. 1983)(county of tribal court and county in
which witnesses resided were adjacent counties separated only by the Nebraska-
South Dakota state line); People ex reL J.J., 454 N.W.2d 317, 330 (S.D. 1990)(tribal
court in North Dakota, a short distance from the state line with South Dakota, wit-
nesses were in Rapid City, South Dakota, less than 200 miles from tribal court); In
re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d 311, 317 (Iowa 1984)(Iowa to South Dakota).
223. See, e.g., Chester County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Coleman, 399 S.E.2d 773
(S.C. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2017 (1991)(South Carolina to South Dakota). The
court there reversed a finding by the court below that it would be more inconve-
nient for the tribe to participate in South Carolina than for the participants to go to
South Dakota. Id. at 775-76. However, it has been persuasively argued that the
party best able to pay these expenses, ie., the state, ought to do so in order to com-
ply with the goals of the ICWA. See In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action,
635 P.2d 187, 192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Mack T.
Jones, Indian Child Welfare: A Jurisdictional Approach, 21 ARiz. L. REv. 1123,
1143 (1979). One case suggested that the distance rationale is compounded by the
fact that the tribal court would have no subpoena power in another state. In re
Wayne R.N., 757 P.2d 1333, 1336 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988). We know of no other re-
ported case in which this objection is raised, and would point out that, under 25
U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1988) of the ICWA, a tribal court's process for obtaining witnesses
and evidence should be enforceable in any state just as is process from sister states.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 548.26 eL seq. (1990).
224. House Report, supra note 14, at 21.
225. In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 635 P.2d at 189.
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statements from the legislative history and the BIA Guidelines to
support the notion that a tribal court is a forum non conveniens
are actually turning that concept on its head. The rule of forum
non conveniens was designed by courts in order to refuse jurisdic-
tion over a matter, not to accept jurisdiction to the exclusion of an-
other, better-suited forum.226 The better cases are the ones which
recognize in the policy statements of the ICWA the presumption
that the tribal court is the best adjudicator of this type of place-
ment decision. Those cases accept that the best forum for the de-
termination of a child's placement is that which is consistent with




Moreover, liberal construction of the forum non conveniens
factor would mean that few, if any, cases would be transferred to
tribal court unless the child lived on or near a reservation. That,
in turn, would be contrary to Congress' purposes in enacting the
ICWA.228 As the Montana Supreme Court noted, in one of the
very first ICWA decisions:
Each individual is an amalgam of the predominant religious,
linguistic, ancestral and educational influences existent in his
or her surroundings. Indian people, whether residing on a res-
ervation or not, are immersed in an environment which is in
most respects antithetical to their traditions. Furthermore the
cultural diversity among Indian tribes is unquestionably
profound yet often not fully appreciated or adequately pro-
tected in our society... Preservation of Indian culture is un-
doubtedly threatened and thereby thwarted as the size of any
tribal community dwindles. In addition to its artifacts, lan-
guage and history, the members of a tribe are its culture. Ab-
sent the next generation, any culture is lost and necessarily
relegated, at best, to anthropological examination and
categorization.2 29
C. Tribal Court Jurisdiction
Federal laws enacted during various periods of federal Indian
226. Mack T. Jones, Indian Child Welfare: A Jurisdictional Approach, 21 ARIz.
L. REv. 1123, 1142 (1979).
227. In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982) (transfer from Arizona to Montana); In re
M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313 (Mont. 1981)(transfer from Montana to North Dakota); In re
Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986)(transfer from Utah to New Mexico); In re
Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1066-67 (Ill. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 555 N.E.2d 374, (Ill.)
cert denied, 111 S.Ct. 345 (1990)(transfer from California to Kansas); In re B.W.,
454 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)(post-appeal transfer from Minnesota to Ne-
braska) (copy of the trial court's order is on file with LAW & INEQUALITY).
228. In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d at 1067.
229. In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Mont. 1981).
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policy have created a network of jurisdictional schemes. Portions
of the ICWA address these. It is important for lawyers represent-
ing native families to know when tribal court jurisdiction exists.
Section 1911 permits tribes to exercise both exclusive and re-
ferral jurisdiction. An exception to this rule lies in situations in
which ".... jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing
federal law."23 0 The ICWA does not automatically override ex-
isting federal legislation.
Public Law 83-280 (P.L. 280)231, which is part of "existing fed-
eral law," has been the single most restrictive federal law regard-
ing tribal exercise of exclusive or referral jurisdiction over child
custody matters.23 2 Most courts which have considered the issue
have merely assumed that P.L. 280 divested tribes of all jurisdic-
tion; they ask, "why else would Congress have provided for a juris-
diction reassumption clause in section 1918 of the ICWA?"23 But,
because of their inherent sovereignty, tribes are not totally
divested of jurisdiction by P.L. 280;2u the law merely removed ex-
clusive and referral jurisdiction from some tribes, leaving residual
tribal jurisdiction for domestic matters.23 5 For tribes located in
states which were not subjected to P.L. 280, exclusive and referral
jurisdiction already existed before passage of the ICWA.236
1. Public Law 280
Enacted during the "Termination Era" of federal Indian pol-
icy, P.L. 280 is typical of the assimilationist thinking of the
1950s. 23 7 P.L. 280 gave some states jurisdiction over reservation
230. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1988). Exclusive jurisdiction is that which is vested in
the tribe by virtue of its inherent sovereignty. Id. Referral jurisdiction, which is
often referred to in the literature as concurrent jurisdiction, is that which is shared
by the tribe and by the state court. E.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911(b), 1918, 1922.
231. Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90, codifed a4 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988).
232. See, e.g., In re K.E., 744 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1987)(Alaskan native village
lacked authorization to terminate parental rights but in light of Pub. L. No. 280 the
case was remanded to determine whether an application for reassumption under
ICWA 25 U.S.C. § 1918 (1988) was filed).
233. See Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska, 687 F.Supp. 1380, 1394
(D. Alaska 1988), rev'd, 918 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1990). This Ninth Circuit decision
also calls into question the precedential value of Native Village of Nenana v. State,
722 P.2d 219 (Alaska), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986).
234. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 387 (1976). See also Native Village
of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska, 918 F.2d 797; Barsh, supra note 14, at 1302 n.90.
235. Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska, 918 F.2d at 810-11.
236. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1988) for the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the
ICWA.
237. Federal policy towards the native peoples in the last 100 years has gone
through four distinct phases. In the 1880's the dominant policy was assimilation,
under which native peoples were expected to adapt themselves to white main-
1992]
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criminal matters23 8 and civil causes of action 239 without tribal con-
sent.240 All areas of Indian country241 of five original states were
included in this Act: California, Minnesota (excluding the Red
Lake Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (excluding the Warm
Springs Reservation) and Wisconsin (excluding the Menominee
Reservation). 242 Alaska was subsequently added to these five.
243
P.L. 280 gave states not included in the five above the authority to
assume jurisdiction over Indian country without tribal consent, if
permitted by state law.244 In almost all cases, states which had na-
tive populations, and which wanted to assume jurisdiction, enacted
legislation which enabled them to do so. 24 5
P.L. 280's goals were to legitimize state interests 246 in reser-
vations, to diminish federal government obligations to tribes, and
to reduce the "lawlessness on the reservations and the accompany-
stream society, manifested in legislation such as the Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. § 331
(1988). See generally County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S.Ct. 683,
685-86 (1992). The 1930's was the period of Indian reorganization, manifested in leg-
islation such as the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461, et seq. (1988). Fed-
eral policy in the 1950's followed a course of termination of Indian tribes in another
effort to assimilate native peoples into majority society, and was manifested in leg-
islation such as Pub. L. 280. In the 1970's federal policy returned to one of native
self-determination, manifested in legislation such as the ICWA, the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. 1301 et. seq. (1988), and the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. 450 eL seq. (1988).
238. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988).
239. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988).
240. See Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction
Over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 535, 540-41 (1974-75) [hereinafter,
Goldberg].
241. Indian Country is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988), which states:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the juris-
diction of the United States government, notwithstanding the issuance
of any patent, and including rights-of-way running through the
reservation;
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof and whether within or without the limits of a state;
and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been ex-
tinguished including rights of way running through the same.
242. The Menominee Reservation was included by Congressional Act of August
24, 1954.
243. Congressional Act of August 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, § 2, 72 Stat. 545.
244. Goldberg, supra note 240 at 546-547.
245. Id. All surrounding states enacted legislation, with the exception of those
states in which tribes had already lost jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280 (i.e., Wisconsin
and Nebraska). In 1957 and 1961, South Dakota enacted legislation to accept juris-
diction. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-1-12 to 1-1-21 (1992). In 1963 North Dakota
also enacted such legislation. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-19-01 to 27-19-13 (1991).
In 1967, Iowa also followed suit. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 1.12-1.14 (1989).
246. See Goldberg, supra note 240, at 540-41.
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ing threat to Anglos living nearby."247
In 1883, the United States Supreme Court said in Ex Parte
Crow Dog 2 48 that native tribes were under the pupilage of the
United States as dependent communities that regulate their own
domestic affairs and are permitted to define law and order accord-
ing to their own laws and customs.249 Although regarding its im-
portance less rigorously than white society, native peoples did have
law and order. But federal Indian policy beginning late in the
nineteenth century hoped to transform the dependent native com-
munity into a self-supporting and self-governed society according
to white eurocentric political and economic models. 250
Not only did native people resist assimilation but, at the same
time, the federal government utterly failed in its fiduciary duty to
follow through in creating what it had set out to do. The federal
government succeeded only in designing failure-prone tribal enti-
ties by providing limited resources to law enforcement on the res-
ervations and remaining passive with respect to enhancement of
tribal courts.251 Ironically, reservation lawlessness became more
of a problem after passage of P.L. 280.
With respect to tribal court jurisdiction over child custody
matters, "lawlessness" was an even more questionable rationale
for state assumption of civil jurisdiction.252 Actually, legislative
history on state assumption of civil jurisdiction is weak.253 The
grant of civil jurisdiction:
seems to have been primarily intended to redress the lack of
adequate Indian forums for resolving private legal disputes
[that is, civil laws which concern private rights and status, e.g.
laws of contract, tort, marriage, divorce25 4] between reserva-
tion Indians, and between Indians and other private citizens,
by permitting the courts of the State to decide such
disputes.255
Prior to passage of P.L. 280, the Bureau of Indian Affairs de-
cided most civil matters.256 Congress' rationale in granting civil ju-
risdiction to the states in P.L. 280, was based primarily on the fact
that the BIA already controlled all civil matters.257 Realizing that
247. Id at 541, citing, S.Rep. No. 699, 83rd Cong. 1st Sess. 5 (1953).
248. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
249. Id. at 568-69.
250. Id.
251. Goldberg, supra note 240, at 541 nn.29-30.
252. Id. at 542-43.
253. Id.
254. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 384 n.10 (1976).
255. Id. at 384.




tribes had undergone years of the BIA's paternalistic control over
civil matters, the Senate was convinced that Indians ". . . [had]
reached a stage of acculturation and development that makes de-
sirable extension of State civil jurisdiction..."258 However, this ra-
tionale for extension of state jurisdiction over civil matters
expressly contradicts the rationale for state jurisdiction over crimi-
nal matters-namely "reservation lawlessness."2 59 It appears that
civil jurisdiction was an afterthought consistent with the assimila-
tionist policy of the time.260
Social and political developments by the 1970's changed the
nature of federal dealings with Native Americans. Tribal auton-
omy and self-determination became the new theory in federal pol-
icy. Consistent with the new thinking,261 P.L. 280's grant of
authority to the states was limited by the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968 ("ICRA"), which required tribal consent for states to as-
sume jurisdiction if they had not already done so. 2 62 The ICRA
did not affect the pre-1968 states. By then, however, a number of
additional states had already assumed jurisdiction and the ICRA
did little to change this effect of P.L. 280. The ICWA's section 1918
complements the ICRA by permitting tribes affected by P.L. 280 to
reassume jurisdiction upon petition to the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, and thus nearly completes the circle around which tribal ju-
risdiction has travelled since P.L. 280 was enacted.263
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court held that P.L. 280
was "plainly not meant to effect total assimilation," 264 thus recog-
nizing a continuing role for tribal sovereignty. However, subse-
quent cases addressing jurisdictional issues with respect to tribal
reassumption never distinguished child custody proceedings from
other private right cases.265 P.L. 280 continues to limit tribal juris-
diction over child custody matters even when children reside and
are domiciled on the reservation. Courts have refused to consider
inherent tribal sovereignty in light of P.L. 280, notwithstanding
the fact that the ICWA permits tribal reassumption of child cus-
tody jurisdiction.266
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1990, however, ruled
258. Id.
259. 1&
260. A at 543-44. See also Carver, supra note 14 at 332.
261. See supra note 237.
262. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-23 (1988).
263. 25 U.S.C. § 1918 (1988).
264. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 387 (1976).
265. See supra notes 233-34. For a discussion of tribal reassumption of jurisdic-
tion see inrfra notes 273-303 and accompanying text.
266. Id.
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in favor of tribal autonomy and recognized native people's right of
self-determination, to make their own laws and to be ruled by
them.26 7 The court first held that Indian tribes which demonstrate
historical sovereignty retain their inherent sovereignty to decide
domestic issues.268 Second, it reiterated that P.L. 280 was never
meant to be a tool for total divestiture.269 Third, the court con-
cluded that tribal jurisdiction is shared with state courts, under
certain circumstances, regardless of whether the children are on or
off the reservation because "tribal sovereignity is not coterminous
with Indian Country. 270 Finally, since the ICWA's jurisdictional
provisions and those of P.L. 280 are at best ambiguous, the court
held that the canons of statutory construction dictate that any am-
biguity must be resolved in favor of the Indians.2 71 Consequently,
ICWA sections 1911 (a) and (b) presumptively recognize inherent
tribal sovereignty, and operate to broaden the tribes' existing juris-
diction to become exclusive or referral.272The Ninth Circuit's view,
that P.L. 280 is no longer consistent with contemporary federal In-
dian policy, was earlier recognized in section 1918 of the ICWA.
2. Tribal Reassumption of Jurisdiction
Section 1918 of the ICWA seeks to return control of child cus-
tody matters to tribes which were forcibly divested of that jurisdic-
tion by P.L. 280, or which were located in states which assumed
jurisdiction by passage of state law after P.L. 280.273 All tribes in
Minnesota,274 with the exception of the Red Lake Band of Chip-
pewa, lost exclusive or referral jurisdiction under P.L. 280. Be-
cause of Minnesota's notorious history of placing a
disproportionate number of native children with non-native fami-
lies, it is essential for Minnesota tribes to reassume jurisdiction
over child custody matters. Currently, Red Lake and Lake Mille
Lacs are the only tribal courts in this state litigating child custody
cases. 275
267. Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska, 918 F.2d 797 (9th Cir.
1990).
268. Id. at 807.
269. Id at 809-10.
270. Id. at 808, n. 13.
271. Id. at 810; see also supra, text accompanying note 85.
272. See notes 187, 313-20 and accompanying text; 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911 (a) - (b)
(1988). See note 230, supra for the distinction between exclusive and referral
jurisdiction.
273. 25 U.S.C. § 1918(a) (1988).
274. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988).
275. The Lake Mille Lacs Band of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe has recently
established a tribal court which hears child custody matters. Some Minnesota
counties have not honored that court's orders for placement and payment of place-
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Under section 1918(a), tribes affected by P.L. 280 may peti-
tion the Secretary of the Department of the Interior for reassuxmp-
tion and present a suitable plan to exercise jurisdiction.276 By
petitioning for reassumption, tribes are not acknowledging a com-
plete and total loss of jurisdiction.277 Rather, petitioning is a pro-
cess in which a tribe is merely reasserting other tiers of
jurisdiction. 278 Accepted principles of inherent tribal sovereignty
recognize a tribe's inherent jurisdiction which can not be
divested.279 P.L. 280 was not intended to "supplant tribal institu-
tions, but to supplement them."28 0 Nevertheless, courts in other
jurisdictions have refused to transfer cases to tribal courts when it
was uncertain if petitions for reassumption had been filed or
whether reassumption had been granted.281
Section 1918(b) sets out the criteria the Secretary of the Inte-
rior must consider to determine whether a tribe may reassume ju-
risdiction over child custody disputes. Primarily, but not
exclusively, the Secretary is concerned with the following factors:
the number of persons enrolled with the tribe who will be affected
by reassumption;28 2 the size of the reservation;283 the total popula-
tion of the tribe;284 and finally the feasibility of the plan, especially
when a consortium of tribes is contemplated.28 5 The statute does
not indicate how these requirements are weighed in the decision-
making process.
In 1979, the BIA promulgated rules to establish procedures
by which a tribe may reassume jurisdiction over child custody pro-
ceedings. 28 6 The BIA Guidelines permit three reassumption
schemes. Tribal entities may be granted: (1) total reassunmption;287
ment costs, relying on an opinion by the Field Solicitor of the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs that the establishment of that tribal court does not comport with the
requirements of the Constitution of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe. Some Minne-
sota counties do, however, recognize the court and honor its orders.
276. 25 U.S.C. § 1918 (1988).
277. Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska, 918 F.2d 797 (9th Cir.
1990).
278. Id.
279. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
280. Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska, 918 F.2d at 810.
281. See In re K.E., 744 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1987); Native Village of Nenana v.
State, 722 P.2d 219, 222 (Alaska), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986) (bath courts re-
jected transfer of jurisdiction to the tribe where where the tribe had not petitioned
for reassumption and where it was unknown whether the petition had been
approved.
282. 25 U.S.C. § 1918(b)(1)(i) (1988).
283. 25 U.S.C. § 1918(b)(1)(ii) (1988).
284. 25 U.S.C. § 1918(b)(1)(iii) (1988).
285. 25 U.S.C. § 1918(b)(iv) (1988).
286. 25 C.F.R. 13.01-.16 (1992).
287. 25 C.F.R. 13.1(a) & (b).
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(2) the right to form a consortium with other tribes or bands that
will exercise jurisdiction over all the tribes desiring to be part of
the consortium;288 or (3) limited jurisdiction.
28 9
Prior to the petitioning process there must be authority for
the tribe to undertake such an action within the tribal constitution
authorizing the tribal government to exercise jurisdiction over In-
dian child custody matters.2w Additionally, there must be support
in the form of a resolution by the governing body authorizing or
legitimizing the tribe's assertion of jurisdiction.291 Tribes should
supply a description of existing or proposed tribal courts2 9 2 to the
Secretary, along with the tribal ordinances or court rules which es-
tablish procedure or rules for the exercise of such jurisdiction.
293
Other requirements for the petition include membership informa-
tion,294 a time line for reassumption, 295 child and family support
services to be available,29 6 expected number of child custody
cases2 97 and any tribal-state agreements already entered.2 9 8
Technical assistance to enable a tribe to meet criteria for peti-
tion approval shall be provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
and Area Offices if the tribe requests it.29 In the event the Secre-
tary of the Interior disapproves the petition, the BIA must offer
technical assistance to overcome any defects in the plan or
petition.300
At present, we have no information of any pending petitions
for Minnesota tribes. Tribes in the surrounding states have pur-
sued establishment of tribal court authority more vigorously. For
example, in North and South Dakota, which assumed jurisdiction
after passage of P.L. 280, tribes have sucessfully applied for and re-
288. 25 C.F.R. 13.1(c).
289. 25 C.F.R. 13.1(d).
290. 25 C.F.R. 13.11(a)(7).
291. 25 C.F.R. 13.11(a)(2).
292. 25 C.F.R. 13.11(a)(8) requires compliance with 25 U.S.C. § 1903(12) (1988),
which mandates that a tribal court have jurisdiction over child custody proceedings
and must be either a Court of Indian Offenses, a court established and operated
under the code or custom of a tribe, or any other administrative body of a tribe
which is vested with authority over child custody proceedings. A description shall
include an organizational chart and budget. If non-tribal funds will be used,
sources and amounts should be included.
293. 25 C.F.R. 13.11(a)(9).
294. 25 C.F.R. 13.11(a)(4)-(6).
295. 25 C.F.R. 13.11(a)(3).
296. 25 C.F.R. 13.11(a)(10).
297. 25 C.F.R. 13.11(a)(11).
298. 25 C.F.R. 13.11(a)(12).
299. 25 C.F.R. 13.13(a) & (b).
300. 25 C.F.R. 13.16.
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ceived full jurisdiction to hear child custody matters.3 0 ' About
half of the tribes in Wisconsin3 0 2 have reassumed civil jurisdiction
to hear child custody matters. The Omaha Tribe of Nebraska ex-
ercises jurisdiction over child custody matters, 30 3 but the Sac and
Fox Tribe of Iowa does not. There has been no reported litigation
in Minnesota under section 1918 nor in surrounding states.
3. Tribal-State Agreements
Section 1919 authorizes tribes to enter into3° 4 and revoke
3 05
agreements with states limited to care and custody of children and
jurisdiction over child custody proceedings.30 6 In Minnesota, the
Commissioner of Human Services is the state official authorized to
enter into such agreements with the tribes,30 7 although prior
agreements have been entered into by the governor. 308 These
agreements are not mandatory, 09 and tribes which exercise exclu-
sive jurisdiction are not precluded from entering into such agree-
ments.3 10 Tribes acting in a consortium may also enter into these
types of agreements. For example, during 1980 and 1981, the State
of Minnesota entered into two such agreements with the Minne-
sota Chippewa TribeSii and the Minnesota Sioux Tribe.312 Each
agreement was tailored to the needs of that specific community.
The agreements basically provided that the state shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the child custody proceedings, consistent
with ICWA, and the state shall provide proper notice to each tribe
of any such proceeding and assume costs.
301. See Tribal Court Chart, appended.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 25 U.S.C. § 1919(a) (1988).
305. 25 U.S.C. § 1919(b) (1988).
306. 25 U.S.C. § 1919(a) (1988).
307. MINN. STAT. § 257.354, subd. 5 (1990).
308. Copies of these agreements between the state and the Minnesota Chippewa
Tribe and the Minnesota Sioux communities are on file with LAw & INEQUALITY.
The current status of these agreements is in flux and may soon change.
309. Native Village of Stevens v. Smith, 770 F.2d 1486, 1489 (9th Cir. 1985), cert
denied, 475 U.S. 1121 (1986).
310. See, e.g., Sayers v. Beltrami County, 472 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991),
reversed on other grounds, 481 N.W.2d 547 (Minn. 1992)(dictum).
311. The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe is a consortium of tribes organized under
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, and consists of these reservations: Bois
Forte, Fond du Lac, Grand Portage, Lake Mille Lacs, Leech Lake and White Earth.
25 U.S.C. § 461, et. seq. (1988)
312. The Minnesota Sioux Tribe consists of the following communities: Upper
Sioux (Granite Falls), Lower Sioux (Morton), Prairie Island and Shakopee
Mdewakanton.
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4. Tribal Court Exclusive Jurisdiction
The ICWA recognizes the tribe's inherent exclusive jurisdic-
tion over children who are its wards.
313 Case law suggests that
this jurisdictional determination may be complex, and depend
upon when the child becomes a ward of the tribe.314 For example,
a mother may not be presently domiciled on a reservation because
she is neither currently enrolled as a member nor residing on the
reservation proper. It may prove troublesome if the child becomes
the subject of a CHIPS proceeding. If the mother enrolls herself
and the child, then the question arises whether the tribal court
will have exclusive jurisdiction when domicile has already been es-
tablished in the state. Case law in other states suggests that the
timing of domicile may offset tribal jurisdiction.3i5 Nevertheless,
the tribe may exercise presumptive jurisdiction over
nondomiciliaries 3i 6 , or exercise its right to intervene in all other
state court proceedings.
317
The tribal court retains exclusive jurisdiction over any child
custody proceeding3i8 involving an Indian child who resides or is
313. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1988). See In re C.C.T.L., No. C3-88-253 (Minn. Ct. App.
May 31, 1988).
314. See, e.g., In re R.I., 402 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). After her divorce,
a mother from Red Lake was awarded legal custody of her children, who were all
enrolled at their father's reservation, the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs
in Oregon. The children lived there with their father after the divorce. During this
time, the Warm Springs tribal court issued emergency custody orders making them
wards of that court. The following year, the mother returned to Warm Springs to
bring the children to the Leech Lake reservation in Minnesota. There, a depen-
dency petition was filed in state court. In In re R.I., the court held that when the
dependency proceeding was commenced, the children were residents of and domi-
ciled in Cass County, Minnesota. The court ignored the fact that the children were
already wards of the Warm Springs tribal court and rationalized that, since the
children had changed their domicile and were found temporarily off the reserva-
tion, the court had authority to remove them under 25 U.S.C. § 1922 (1988) of the
ICWA.
315. In re T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 306 (Ind. 1988) holds that 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)
(1988) wardship orders are valid only if entered while the child is residing or domi-
ciled on the reservation. This holding's precedential value was seriously under-
mined the following year by Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30, 36 (1989), permitting a tribe to enter wardship orders regardless of
residence.
316. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988).
317. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1988). See also notes 190, 336-42 and accompanying text.
318. As these are defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988), except in the limited cir-
cumstances in which § 1922 grants state courts limited authority over reservation
domiciliaries, and except in Pub. L. No. 280 states. See notes 120, 230-72 and accom-
panying text. Because Minnesota is a Pub. L. No. 280 state, it appears that the state
may exercise its jurisdiction on all reservations with the exception of that of the
Red Lake Band of Chippewa, which was specifically exempted from P.L. 280. See
In re R.I., 402 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). See also MDHS Regulations,
supra note 74, at XIII-3550(1), which specifically denounce local agency interven-
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domiciled39 within the reservation.3 20 Notwithstanding this rule,
not all tribes exercise exclusive jurisdiction for two reasons: first,
existing federal law, such as P.L. 280, deprives them of the right to
do so; and second, the tribe may not have a legal body or a juvenile
code to adjudicate child custody proceedings. In Minnesota, the
Red Lake Band of Chippewa and the Lake Mille Lacs Band of the
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe are the only tribes currently exercising
exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters involving their
wards and domiciliaries. Remaining tribes fall into either of two
categories: 1) those which exercise no jurisdiction and 2) those
which exercise limited jurisdiction over non-child custody
proceedings.321
In Wisconsin, almost all tribes and bands have created tribal
courts and codes, with about half of the tribes adjudicating juve-
nile (child custody cases) proceedings.3 22 In North and South Da-
kota, most tribes have tribal courts and codes. Here tribes
vigorously exercise jurisdiction in all cases.323 In Iowa, the state's
only federally recognized tribe, the Sac and Fox Tribe, does not
exercise jurisdiction over child custody matters.324 However, the
Omaha Tribe of Nebraska does exercise such jurisdiction over
child custody matters.3
25
If a child custody case is tranferred to tribal court, practition-
ers must follow the tribal or juvenile code with respect to profes-
sional admission to tribal court and substantive and procedural
codes. Practitioners should be aware that tribal court develop-
ment, in Minnesota and all surrounding states, is a dynamic area
and one which is currently undergoing rapid evolution and change.
tion when the child is on the reservation and the tribal court has exclusive
jurisdiction.
319. Domicile is not defined within the ICWA. However, the Court has tried to
define this term as noted in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30, 48 (1989):
For adults, domicile is established by physical presence in a place in
connection with a certain state of mind concerning one's intent to re-
main there.. .One acquires a "domicile of origin" at birth, and that
domicile continues until a new one (a "domicile of choice") is ac-
quired... Since most minors are legally incapable of forming the requi-
site intent to establish a domicile, their domicile is determined by that
of their parents.
320. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1988).
321. See chart at end of article for a listing of individual tribes and jurisdiction of
their courts, and note 275, supra concerning the Lake Mille Lacs tribal court.
322. 1&
323. 1&
324. We were unable to gather specific information concerning the Sac and Fox
Tribe of Iowa.
325. See supra note 321.
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5. Full Faith and Credit Clause
Section 1911(d), the Full Faith and Credit Clause,3 26 is a sig-
nificant step towards whittling away the paternalistic relationship
between the federal government and tribal entities. Basically sec-
tion 1911(d) places the tribal entity in parity with other states.
One commentator has suggested that the words "any other entity"
in this clause are more ambiguous and leave less certainty as to
whether a tribal court decision is followed equally.3S In Minne-
sota, courts have followed the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
ICWA328 except in one case where the children were found off the
reservation while under another tribe's wardship.3 29
VI. If the Case Stays in Court, How Is It Adjudicated?
A. Introduction
If the CHIPS or termination case stays in state court, it will
be tried before a judge of juvenile court in the same manner as any
non-ICWA case. The ICWA does not displace substantive state
law.330 The proceeding will therefore be an ordinary adjudication
326. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1988) provides:
The United States, every State, every Territory or possession of the
United States, and every Indian tribe shall give full faith and credit to
the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe
applicable to Indian child custody proceedings to the same extent that
such entities give full faith and credit to the public acts, records and
judicial proceedings of any other entity.
327. Barsh, supra note 14, at 1312.
328. See, e.g., In re C.C.T.L., No. C3-88-253 (Minn. Ct. App. May 31, 1988)(defer-
ence given to Standing Rock Sioux tribal court's decision to award custody of child
to father).
329. See, e.g., In re R.I., 402 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (court justi-
fied the emergency removal of children on the ground that they were temporarily
off the reservation, and, in fact, changed domicile and residence, thereby refusing
to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Warm Springs tribal court. But cf.
Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (husband voluntarily
invoked state court jurisdiction, thereby denying tribal court jurisdiction). One
court has held that, notwithstanding the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a receiving
court may always examine whether the transmitting court had jurisdiction to act in
the way it did. In re T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 306 (Ind. 1988). See also Desjarlait v.
Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d at 144 (court suggested that a state court may decline to ex-
tend comity to a tribal court order if the tribal court deprived a litigant due pro-
cess) and Carver, supra note 14 at 342-43. By citing these principles, we do not
necessarily agree with them.
330. The ICWA sets minimum procedural and evidentiary standards, but does
not purport to recodify for the 50 states their substantive juvenile codes. A recently
released article misunderstands this point when it says, "the ICWA mandates ter-
minating parental rights when continued custody is likely to result in harm to a
child." Marcia L. Howell-Rom, Note, The State of the Act: The Indian Child Wel-
fare Act in Minnesota After In the Matter of the Welfare of B. W. and In the Matter
of the Welfare of M.S.S., 14 HAMIjs L. REV. 427, 441 (Spring 1991)(emphasis ad-
ded). This statement is not only wrong in terms of what the ICWA actually says,
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of an ordinary state law petition,331 subject, however, to the
ICWA's procedural and proof requirements. The ICWA will con-
trol where state law rules provide a lesser degree of protection to a
native litigant in state court than does the ICWA.332 Conversely,
any state law rule providing more extensive rights to a native liti-
gant will control, notwithstanding the ICWA.333 State law rules
compatible with the ICWA will remain in effect.3 34 At trial, the
rules of civil procedure and the rules of evidence will usually
apply.3 3 5
B. Pretrial Procedure
The ICWA contains several pretrial requirements of impor-
tance to the Minnesota practitioner.
The first requirement provides that indian tribes which do
not request transfer to tribal court are permitted to intervene3 36 at
any stage of the proceeding.337 The tribe typically will be notified
by the agency pursuant to the ICWA's section 1912(a) that it can
intervene and participate, seek a transfer to tribal court, or not
participate at all.3w As previously noted,339 some tribes do not
but it also misunderstands the role the ICWA plays in operation of each state's sub-
stantive juvenile law.
331. The petition will be brought under the so-called CHIPS law, MINN. STAT.
§ 260.015, subd. 2a (1990), or will be a termination of rights petition brought under
MINN. STAT. § 260.221 (1990).
332. For example, state law requires that most termination of parental rights
proceedings be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Minn. R. Juv. P. 59.05; In
re Rosenbloom, 266 N.W.2d 888, 889-90 (Minn. 1978). By contrast, the ICWA re-
quires such a petition to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)
(1988).
333. 25 U.S.C. § 1921 (1988). See In re B.W., 454 N.W.2d 437, 443-46 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990), (more protective "Indian expert witness" requirement of the MDHS
Regulations should be followed). See also supra notes 80-82, 97-99 and accompany-
ing text.
334. See e.g. MINN. R. Juv. P. 57 (discovery rules).
335. Minnesota law indicates that the rules of evidence apply only to "CHIPS"
cases which involve certain status offenses. MINN STAT. 260.155, subd. 1 (1990).
However, the rules of juvenile procedure indicate that the rules of evidence apply
in juvenile proceedings. MINN. R. Juv. P. 59.04. Furthermore, the Minnesota rules
of evidence do not exclude CHIPS or termination trials in juvenile court from ap-
plication of the rules. MINN. R. EVID. 1101.
336. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1988).
337. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67590 point out that untimely interven-
tions do not have the same disruptive effect as untimely requests to transfer to tri-
bal court. See, e.g., People ex reL J.J., 454 N.W.2d 317, 330 (S.D. 1990); In re Q.G.M.,
808 P.2d 684, 689 (Okla. 1991)(tribe may intervene at any time); In re M.E.M., 725
P.2d 212, 214 (Mont. 1986)(late intervention permissible when intervenor denied in-
formation about proceeding). See also supra notes 202-205 and accompanying text;
MDHS Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3581.
338. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67588; MDHS Regulations supra note 74,
at XIII-3561.
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seek a transfer to tribal court, for reasons related to membership
eligibility, finances, or distance, and some tribes decide not to in-
tervene for the same reasons.3 40 Courts have suggested that tribes
must intervene to protect the placement preferences under section
1915.341 The Minneapolis American Indian Center has for some
years provided courtesy representation for distant tribes.342
The second pretrial requirement instructs the court to pro-
vide counsel to indigent parents and custodians upon request.
3 43
This is consistent with Minnesota law.3 "
A third pretrial provision of the ICWA relates to examination
of reports.3 45 The statute provides that any party to a foster care
placement or termination proceeding involving an Indian child has
the right to examine all reports filed with the court. The BIA
Guidelines provide that no adjudicatory decision may be made by a
trial court based upon a document not filed.3"4 The Indian Family
Preservation Act is broader and requires that the welfare agency
provide the tribe with access to all its files concerning the child
whenever a child is placed or likely to be placed in foster care.
3 47
The fourth and last pretrial procedural provision of the
ICWA precludes a state court from hearing any matter involving a
native child in which the petitioner has improperly removed the
339. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
340. Id.
341. In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d 10, 18 (Alaska 1984). The decision notes that a petition
to invalidate a placement cannot be made for a violation of 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988);
see also In re Q.G.M., 808 P.2d 684, 688 (Okla. 1991); In re Baby Girl A., 282 Cal.
Rptr. 105, 108-109 & n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). But J.R.S. and other cases note that
the right of intervention under 25 U.S.C. § 911(c) (1988) may not extend to adoption
proceedings. See infra notes 411, 418 and accompanying text.
342. The Minneapolis American Indian Center has an ICWA court monitor pro-
gram. On occasion, the center is contacted by tribes which have received notice,
and would like to appear but are unable to do so. The center's personnel will occa-
sionally appear and inform the court of the prospective intervening tribe's position.
This helps to implement 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1988).
343. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (1988). See, e.g., State ex. reL Juvenile Dep't of Multno-
mah County v. Charles, 688 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), review dismissed,
701 P.2d 1053 (Or. 1985)(counsel must be appointed as soon as the court knows an
Indian child is at issue and the parents are indigent); In re G.L.O.C., 668 P.2d 235,
237-38 (Mont. 1983); In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1316-17 (Mont. 1981).
344. See MINN. R. Juv. P. 40.01, subd. 3; MINN. STAT. § 260.155, subd. 2 (1990).
See MDHS Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3584. Under Minnesota law, a
grandparent with whom the child has lived within the last two years has a right to
participate. MINN. STAT. § 260.155, subd. 1(a) (1990). The presiding judge of the
Hennepin County Juvenile Court prior to 1990 routinely appointed counsel not
only for this type of participant but often for other relatives, many times resulting
in four or more public appointments in the same case.
345. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(c) (1988).
346. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67592; MDHS Regulations supra note 74,
at XIII-3582.
347. MINN. STAT. § 257.352, subd. 2 (1990).
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child from the parent or custodian.34" In those circumstances, the
court must decline to exercise jurisdiction and must return the
child to the parent or custodian unless doing so would subject the
child to "substantial and immediate danger." 349 The legislative
history indicates that such a showing of immediate danger cannot
be made by or on behalf of the wrongful petitioner.35 0 This provi-
sion, section 1920, does not accord relief to a parent complaining
about the actions of the local welfare agency. 35 1 The BIA Guide-
lines state that pursuant to section 1920 the trial court must make
a threshhold determination of whether an improper removal oc-
curred before before proceeding on the merits.3 5 2
C Adjudicatory Procedures and Burden of Proof
The ICWA imposes two adjudicatory burdens upon a peti-
tioner, one with regard to its petition, the other with regard to the
services offered to the family.
1. Burden of Proof As To The Petition
(i) Introduction: Non-ICWA Burden
A Minnesota CHIPS petition must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence, whether or not it involves a native family and
the ICWA.353 A Minnesota termination petition involving a non-
native family must also be proven by clear and convincing evi-
dence.35 4 By contrast, a termination petition involving a native
family under the ICWA must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.3 5
(ii) Introduction: ICWA Burden
The ICWA provides that before either foster care placement
or termination of parental rights may be ordered, there must be a
finding that "continued custody of the child by the parent or In-
dian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical
348. 25 U.S.C. § 1920 (1988). See generally In re C.C.T.L., No. C3-88-253 (Minn.
Ct. App. May 31, 1988).
349. 25 U.S.C. § 1920 (1988).
350. House Report, supra note 14, at 25. See D.E.D. v. State, 704 P.2d 774, 782
(Alaska 1985).
351. D.E.D. v. State, 704 P.2d at 782.
352. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67590. The MDHS Regulations do not
have the divided inquiry required by the BIA Guidelines. MDHS Regulations,
supra note 74, at XIII-3591.
353. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (1988); MINN. R. Juv. P. 59.05.
354. MINN. R. Juv. P. 59.05; In re Rosenbloom, 266 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1988).
355. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1988).
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damage to the child."3 Although the language "continued cus-
tody" suggests that before the burden can be met, the child has to
be living with the parent, the cases do not agree.3 5 7 Occasionally a
parent facing a CHIPS petition is living with the child but that is
quite unlikely to occur in a termination situation. Many state law
termination petitions allege that the child is "neglected and in fos-
ter care."3 58 In those circumstances, it is impossible for the parent
to be living with the child. In fact, in most termination situations
the child and the parent are living apart. It appears that the "con-
tinued custody" language requires the court to make a hypotheti-
cal judgment - based upon the record before it - concerning what
the child's status would be if the child were returned to its parent
immediately. 59
The BIA Guidelines specifically note that the burden of dem-
onstrating harm to the child is not met merely by evidence of alco-
holism in the family or by socio-economic conditions. This
provision probably responded to testimony heard by Congress
which suggested that Indian families suffered from the cultural
bias of non-Indian social service agencies which assumed that all
Indians were drunkards and conformed their services to these
families accordingly.35 0
The BIA Guidelines suggest that the trial court should under-
take a two-part inquiry to determine whether the ICWA's burden
requirement has been met: first, is it likely that the conduct of the
parents will result in serious physical or emotional harm to the
child? second, if such conduct will likely cause such harm, can the
parents be persuaded to modify their conduct?3s 1
356. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) & (f) (1988).
357. In re W.R., 379 N.W.2d 544, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). See also In re
S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); In re Adoption of a Child of Indian
Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 937-38 (N.J. 1988)(discussing varying usages of the term
"custody" in the ICWA). The point is developed further in a recently-released arti-
cle, Marcia L. Howell-Rom, Note, The State of the Act. The Indian Child Welfare
Act in Minnesota After In the Matter of the Welfare of B. W, and In the Matter of
the Welfare ofM.SS., 14 HAMLINE L. REV. 427, 441-43 (Spring 1991).
358. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.221, subd. 1(b)(8); 260.155, subd. 7; 260.015, subd. 18
(1990).
359. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67593; MDHS Regulations, supra note 74,
at XIII-3585.
360. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67593; House Report, supra note 14, at 10.
But see In re M.E.B., Nos. C6-90-2370, C6-90-2388 (Minn. Ct. App. March 19,
1991)(chronic alcohol abuse, along with other problems, can meet the proof require-
ments of 25 U.S.C. § 1912(1988)).




(iii) ICWA Burden: Qualified Expert Witnesses
The proof supporting this two-part inquiry must not only
meet the clear-and-convincing or proof-beyond-reasonable-doubt 362
standards, but it also must be supported by the testimony of quali-
fied expert witnesses. 36 3 Despite the use of the plural form, a
number of cases have held that only one expert witness is neces-
sary.3 64 A few courts have also held that the two-part inquiry
noted in the BIA Guidelines and section 1912's proof requirements
can effectively be answered by a tag-team of experts, each of
whom is qualified to answer a portion. 5
The ICWA does not define the term qualified expert wit-
nesses. The BIA Guidelines, however, have done so, and several
dozen cases throughout the country have further fleshed out the
BIA's definitions.366 The legislative history suggests that a quali-
fied expert witness must have more than the usual social worker
training.36 7 The BIA Guidelines provide that a qualified expert
witness could be:
[i] A member of the Indian child's tribe who is recognized by
the tribal community as knowledgeable in tribal customs
362. The choice of the reasonable doubt standard, used primarily in criminal
cases, was a deliberate one. The Congress noted that "removal of a child from the
parents is a penalty as great, if not greater, than a criminal penalty[.]" House Re-
port, supra note 14, at 22. As the Supreme Court notes, "a standard of
proof. .. 'instruct[s] the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence.. .society
thinks [s]he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions...' " Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979). The choice of a standard of proof serves as a socie-
tal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the liti-
gants. Santosky v. Kramer 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982). See In re B.W., 454 N.W.2d 437,
445 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); see also In re J.B., 643 P.2d 306, 308 (Okla. 1982).
363. A failure to comply with the 25 U.S.C. 1912(e) & (f) (1988) proof require-
ments will subject a subsequent placement to collateral attack under 25 U.S.C.
§ 1914. In re Morgan, 364 N.W.2d 754, 758 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985). However, 25
U.S.C. § 1914 does not entitle the moving party to a de novo review of the evidence.
In re Roberts, 732 P.2d 528, 531 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). See also MDHS Regulations,
supra note 74, at XIII-3594.
364. The BIA Guidelines use the language "one or more." BIA Guidelines,
supra note 73 at 67593. See also In re M.E.B., Nos. C6-90-2370, C6-90-2388 (Minn.
Ct. App. March 19, 1991); In re T.O., 759 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Alaska 1988); In re Rob-
erts, 732 P.2d at 533; In re Kreft, 384 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); D.A.W.
v. State, 699 P.2d 340, 342 (Alaska 1985).
365. In re T.O., 759 P.2d at 1310; In re Kreft, 384 N.W.2d at 847-48.
366. The BIA Guidelines suggest that the expert must be qualified by reason of
educational background and prior experience to make judgments on the two-part
inquiry that are substantially more reliable than judgments that would be made by
non-experts. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67593. An expert who lacks knowl-
edge about tribal culture and values is not qualified to give an opinion on the 25
U.S.C. § 1912(e) and (f) issues. In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 635
P.2d 187, 192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 P.2d 1007 (1982).
367. House Report, supra note 14, at 22. See In re B.W., 454 N.W.2d 437, 444
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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as they pertain to family organization and childrearing
practices.
[ii] A lay expert witness having substantial experience in the
delivery of child and family services to Indians, and exten-
sive knowledge of prevailing social and cultural standards
and childrearing practices within the Indian child's tribe.
[iii] A professional person having substantial education and
experience in the area of his or her specialty.36s
The Minnesota MDHS Regulations add to the third alternative the
requirement that the professional person have: ". . . substantial
knowledge of prevailing social and cultural standards and child
rearing practices within the Indian community."369
(iv) Minnesota and Foreign Decisions
Although the cases throughout the country run the gamut
from approving highly qualified people as qualified expert wit-
nesses to approving minimally qualified or unqualified people,370 a
canvass of these cases is not particularly helpful to Minnesota law-
yers. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has recently dealt exhaus-
tively with the issue of expert witnesses under the ICWA and has
provided all the guidance on this point that is needed.
In In re B. W ,371 the Minnesota Court of Appeals explicitly
adopted the expanded MDHS Regulations concerning professional
persons as qualified expert witnesses. Basing its decision on that
368. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67593. Basically, what the BIA Guidelines
try to do is to require that the expert be "someone with special knowledge of and
sensitivity to Indian culture." State m re. Juvenile Dep't of Multnomah County v.
Cooke, 744 P.2d 596, 597 (Or. Ct. App. 1987). That same court indicated that the
witness must possess special knowledge of social and cultural aspects of Indian life.
State ex. ret Juvenile Dep't of Multnomah County v. Charles, 688 P.2d 1354, 1359
n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), review dismissed, 701 P.2d 1053 (Or. 1985).
369. MDHS Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3586.
370. Compare In re T.O., 759 P.2d 1308, 1309 n.4 (Alaska 1988); In re Kreft, 384
N.W.2d 843, 847-48 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)(experts acceptable) and In re N.L., 754
P.2d 863, 868 (Okla. 1988); In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1317-18 (Mont. 1981)(experts
not acceptable) with Long v. State Dep't. of Human Resources, 527 So.2d 133, 136
(Ala. Civ. App. 1988); D.W.H. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 706 S.W.2d 840, 843
(Ky. Ct. App. 1986); In re L.N.W., 457 N.W.2d 17, 18 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990)(unquali-
fied experts acceptable). The South Dakota cases are particularly troublesome for
the native citizens of that state. See, e.g., In re K.A.B.E., 325 N.W.2d 840, 843 (S.D.
1982); In re J.L.H., 316 N.W.2d 650, 651 (S.D. 1982).
Although nothing in the ICWA, its legislative history or the BIA Guidelines so
indicates, some courts hold that the qualified expert witness requirement may be
applied less rigorously when the matter before the court does not involve cultural
bias. State ex. rel Juvenile Dep't of Lane County v. Tucker, 710 P.2d 793, 798-99
(Or. Ct. App. 1985), review dismissed, 717 P.2d 1182 (Or. 1986); D.W.H. v. Cabinet
for Human Resources, 706 S.W.2d at 843; Long v. State Dep't of Human Resources,
527 So.2d at 136; Matter of N.L., 754 P.2d at 868. These statements are flatly contra-
dicted by the ICWA, its legislative history and the BIA Guidelines.
371. 454 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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part of the ICWA which permits state law according a higher stan-
dard of protection to native litigants to control,37 2 the court held
both that the termination petition had not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt and that the petitioner's witnesses were not qual-
ified expert witnesses within the meaning of the ICWA, the BIA
Guidelines and the MDHS Regulations.373 The petitioner's social
worker in this case had never been on a Minnesota reservation and
had spent only a few hours on the Flathead reservation in Mon-
tana during graduate school.3 74 She held a Masters of Social Work
degree and had been a social worker for several years. However,
she was unable to name the principal Minnesota Indian tribes, the
location of the reservations, the constituent bands of the Minne-
sota Chippewa Tribe confederation, and was unfamiliar with Min-
nesota Indian history, literature and ceremonies. Moreover, she
was unfamiliar with Indian child-rearing practices, culture and In-
dian-based programs.
The guardian ad litem, like the social worker, was qualified
by the trial court. Although he was part-Ojibwe, he spent most of
his life in the urban areas of the state, returning only occasionally
to the reservation. One of the parents' expert witnesses testified
that the guardian was not known on the reservation. He was an
undergraduate student and a foster parent for Indian children. He
also could not answer questions in the same areas of inquiry put to
the social worker.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that neither of these
witnesses could be qualified as an expert under the "professional
person" portion of the MDHS Regulations, which it adopted for fu-
ture practice under the ICWA in Minnesota.375 In so holding, the
court overruled an earlier decision which suggested that the usual
state law evidentiary rules regarding expert testimony would
control.3 76
The court of appeals, noting the equivocal nature of the
guardian's testimony and the disqualification of the social worker,
held that the petitioner had not proven its case beyond a reason-
372. Id, at 443-44; 25 U.S.C. § 1921 (1988).
373. In re B.W., 454 N.W.2d at 444-45.
374. To the extent that some of these details do not appear in the court's opin-
ion, one of the writers was both trial and appellate counsel for the mother in In re
B.W. and is quite familiar with the trial record and the course of the appeal. We do
not mean to imply by the descriptions of the witnesses in the B.W. case that a
"qualified expert witness" is defined by one monolithic experience. The native ex-
perience in this country is influenced by regional differences, distinctions having to
do with rural and urban life, and is Nation specific.
375. In re B.W., 454 N.W.2d at 443-45.
376. In re T.J.J., 366 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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able doubt as required by section 1912(f). The parents had intro-
duced the testimony of four expert witnesses, at least two of whom
were conceded to be qualified expert witnesses by the
petitioner.3 7
7
In In re M.S.S.,378 the Minnesota Court of Appeals followed
its decision in In re B. W. in two respects. First, it again found that
the evidence offered by the petitioner did not meet the require-
ments of section 1912(f), but for a different reason than that in In
re B. W 379 Second, it adhered to its rule from In re B. W. that the
MDHS Regulations control the issue of qualified expert
witnesses.380
These cases likely stand for the proposition that, in Minne-
sota, an ordinary social worker from a county agency with an
M.S.W. degree will no longer be able to qualify as an expert wit-
ness. In light of In re B. W., and because it is an essential part of
the agency's burden of proof, a lawyer should always be prepared
to examine the agency social worker in detail at trial concerning
her qualifications in this area.
Assuming that to be true, Hennepin County has used two
other methods in its attempts to satisfy the ICWA's requirements
for expert witnesses. The first method was employed in the first
few years after passage of the ICWA. The county attorney would
subpoena a reservation's social services worker to trial, hand the
worker the family's agency file, and attempt to qualify the witness
on that basis as an expert. Although the case in which this tech-
nique was used did not ultimately go to trial, the technique itself is
suspect. It basically requires a witness who does not know the
family or its circumstances to answer hypothetical questions about
likely future physical or emotional harm to the child. Given the
reasoning of In re MS.S., if the witness is unfamiliar with the fam-
377. In re B.W., 454 N.W.2d at 445-46. See also State ex. reL Juvenile Dep't of
Multnomah County v. Charles, 688 P.2d 1354, 1360 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), review dis-
missed 701 P.2d 1053 (Or. 1985) (holding that the standard of proof was not met in
light of the parent's contrary expert testimony).
378. 465 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
379. One of the issues in In re M.S.S. was whether the children could be placed
with a paternal uncle and aunt. The court held that, given the availability of that
placement, the 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1988) requirement that termination could not
occur unless there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody by
an Indian custodian was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to
the child had not been met. Id. at 417.
380. Id. See also In re W.R., 379 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); In re
R.I., 402 N.W.2d 173, 177-78 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In re M.E.B., Nos. C6-90-2370,
C6-90-2388 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1991); In re V.R., No. C2-90-1765 (Minn. Ct.




ily, she may be unfamiliar with potential custodians in the ex-
tended family, and may also be unfamiliar with which types of
programming should be used to assist the family to avoid place-
ment. She therefore would not be able to testify in the manner re-
quired by section 1912.
The second method tried in Hennepin County in the last ten
years to meet the expert witness requirement is the development
of a special unit within the welfare agency called the "Indian Ad-
vocate" unit. That unit is composed of a half-dozen native people
who advocate for the family within the agency, and assist the so-
cial worker in providing services to the family. Those who devel-
oped this plan assumed that this type of agency employee would be
easily qualified as an expert if the case were to be tried, and thus
these employees would ease the difficulty faced by the agency in
meeting the proof requirements. However, the advocates often dif-
fer with both the methods used and the programming offered by
the social worker. They often even disagree with the need for
placement. Moreover, by advocating for the family within the
agency and with the court, these workers often develop a special
relationship with the family which makes it impossible for them to
testify in favor of termination in court. The Hennepin County
agency has recently, for the third time since 1984, forbidden its ad-
vocates to speak with the native families' defense counsel without
county attorney permission. The county attorney has concurrently
adopted a policy under which it will not issue child protection peti-
tions unless the field worker, the advocate and the placement unit
agree on the need for the petition and placement. It remains to be
seen what effect these new policies will have on the effectiveness
of the Indian Advocate unit.
2. Burden As To Remedial Services
The second adjudicatory burden imposed upon the petitioner
by the ICWA is a showing that active efforts have been made to
provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to
prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that the efforts were
unsuccessful.38 1 The requirement applies to foster care place-
381. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1988). The legislative history noted that, while most
states have such a requirement, it is rarely enforced, and the ICWA would there-
fore "impose] a Federal requirement in that regard...." House Report, supra note
14, at 22. The first Minnesota case to apply the ICWA ignored this requirement,
and instead focused upon state law requirements for services. In re R.M.M., 316
N.W.2d 538 (Minn. 1982). It has been held that when, due to the prior termination
of parental rights of one parent, and the fact that the other parent had never ac-
knowledged paternity, there is no "Indian family" within the meaning of 25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(d). In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
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ments and terminations of parental rights.38 2 As previously
noted,38 3 this and other adjudicatory provisions of the ICWA apply
to the entire proceeding, including the initial health and welfare
hold hearing. Both the BIA Guidelines and Minnesota law support
this view.
The BIA Guidelines specifically state that the provision of re-
medial services must take place before the commencement of the
proceeding.38 4 The 1989 "reasonable efforts" legislation explicitly
codified this position into Minnesota law.38
5
The BIA Guidelines specify that the services offered must
take into account prevailing social and cultural conditions and the
way of life of the child's tribe, which includes the use of the child's
extended family.3 86 Minnesota law conforms with the BIA Guide-
lines, but provides much greater detail.38 7 This aspect of the "rea-
sonable efforts" law applies to health and welfare hold hearings,
disposition hearings after a finding on a CHIPS petition, and to
termination trials.388
Decisions in Minnesota and elsewhere have agreed that the
petitioner must prove that remedial services were offered beyond a
reasonable doubt in a termination case, and by clear and convinc-
ing evidence in a CHIPS case.38 9 As the Minnesota Court of Ap-
382. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1988). Section 1912(d) has been held inapplicable to vol-
untary placement proceedings, B.R.T. v. Social Serv. Bd. of N.D., 391 N.W.2d 594,
600 (N.D. 1986). This approach is consistent with the ICWA's prerequisite for provi-
sion of remedial services. No part of the "reasonable efforts" law appears to re-
quire provision of remedial services in voluntary placement cases, see MINN. STAT.
§ 260.012, subds. (a) & (c) (1990), although the Indian Family Preservation Act does
make a brief reference to provision of services in voluntary situations. MINN. STAT.
§ 257.352, subd. 2 (1990).
383. See supra text accompanying note 120.
384. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67592; MDHS Regulations, supra note 74,
at XIII-3583 (refers to "prior to the petition") See B.R.T. v. Social Serv. Bd. of
N.D., 391 N.W.2d at 600 (provision of services must occur before initiation by the
agency of the placement proceeding). But see State ex. reL Juvenile Dep't of Mult-
nomah County v. Charles, 688 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), review dismissed,
701 P.2d 1053 (Or. 1985)(showing of provision of services need only be made at the
hearing on the merits of the petition).
385. MINN. STAT. § 260.172, subd. 1(c) (1990) (specifically applying its require-
ments to detention hearing proceedings.)
386. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67592. In In re M.S.S., 465 N.W.2d 412,
418-19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) the court recently noted the mandatory term "shall"
in this Guideline, and held that the requirement of 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1988) is not
met when the agency refused to explore placement with the brother of one of the
parents. For a discussion of "extended family" see infra note 395.
387. MINN. STAT. § 260.012, subds. (b) & (c) (1990). One of the six requirements
of subdivision (c) is cultural appropriateness. Id.
388. MINN. STAT. § 260.012, subds. (a)-(c) (1990).
389. In re M.S.S., 465 N.W.2d at 418; In re M.E.B., Nos. C6-90-2370, C6-90-2388
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1991); In Re L.N.W., 457 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Iowa Ct. App.
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peals recently stated:
Logically, this seems to be compelled: If termination of paren-
tal rights of Indian parents to their children can be ordered
only upon a factual basis shown beyond a reasonable doubt
[section 1912(f)], and if termination cannot be effected without
a showing of active efforts to prevent the breakup of the In-
dian family and a failure thereof [section 1912(d)], then the ad-
equacy of efforts and futility of them, as predicates to
termination, must likewise be established beyond a reasonable
doubt.390
There are only a handful of decisions in other states discuss-
ing what level of services must be provided and when the services
are to be deemed unsuccessful.3 91 Three Minnesota ICWA cases
have addressed the issue, and these cases coupled with the Minne-
sota "reasonable efforts" statutes make the ICWA's section 1912(d)
remedial services requirements quite clear.3 9 2 Testimony must be
specific concerning the provision of services.
393
1990); People ex rel S.R., 323 N.W.2d 885, 887 (S.D. 1982); In re Kreft, 384 N.W.2d
843, 848 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
390. In re Welfare of M.S.S., 465 N.W.2d at 418.
391. In re Kreft, 384 N.W.2d 843, 848-49 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)(unsuccessful at-
tempt to teach parenting techniques to psychiatric patient); In re S.D., 402 N.W.2d
346, 351 (S.D. 1987)(nomadic family did not contact agency); Long v. Dep't of
Human Resources, 527 So.2d 133, 135 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988)(not specified); People ex
rel J.J., 454 N.W.2d 317, 325 (S.D. 1990)(refusal to acknowledge need to treat sex
offender).
392. In re Welfare of M.S.S., 465 N.W.2d at 417-19; In re M.E.B., Nos. C6-90-2370,
C6-90-2388 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1991); In re V.R., No. C2-90-1765 (Minn. Ct.
App. Apr. 2, 1991). We think that MINN. STAT. § 260.012 (1990) creates a distinction
between efforts deemed "reasonable" in a post-hoc analysis, and "active efforts."
"Reasonable efforts" are those which a social worker might employ when she
merely dictates services to a client, but does no more, and which efforts a court
might later find adequate. However, "active efforts," which we think this statute
requires, are those made by a social worker who assists her native client in enroll-
ing in and successfully completing services, and in taking advantage of the protec-
tions accorded the client by the law. The latter might be assistance to a native
family in enrolling its children with their tribe, see text accompanying note 154, or
in identifying and locating extended family members, if it becomes necessary to
place the children, as required by §§ 257.352, subd. 4 and 257.353, subd. 5 of the In-
dian Family Preservation Act, see Carver, supra note 14 at 347 and In re Crews,
803 P.2d 24, 36 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)(dissenting opinion). Minnesota cases agree
with this analysis. See In re M.A., 408 N.W.2d 227, 235-36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In
re J.A., 377 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); In re K.P.C., 366 N.W.2d 711, 714-
15 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); In re M.G., 407 N.W.2d 118, 122-23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987);
In re A.H., 402 N.W.2d 598, 603-604 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). Minn. Stat. § 260.172,
subd. l(a) recognizes § 260.012's distinction in the types of efforts.
393. State ex. reL Juvenile Dep't of Multnomah County v. Charles, 688 P.2d 1354,
1359 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), review dismissed, 701 P.2d 1053 (Or. 1985).
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VII. Post-Adjudicatory Proceedings-What Happens?
A. P/acements
The ICWA contains two regimens for placing a child after an
adjudicatory finding by the trial court under section 1912.
1. Placements Other Than Adoptions
Placements after a health and welfare hold hearing, before
and during trial, and after trial of a CHIPS case are controlled by
section 1915(b) of the ICWA. Section 1915(b) contains three provi-
sions. First, the child must be placed in the least restrictive setting
which most approximates a family, and in which its special needs,
if any, will be met. Second, the child must be placed within rea-
sonable proximity to its home, taking into account any special
needs. Third, a preference shall be given, absent good cause to the
contrary, to placements in this order:
394
- a member of the child's extended family;39 5
- a foster home licensed, approved or specified by the child's
tribe;3 9 6
- an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized
non-Indian licensing agency;
39 7
- an institution for children approved by the child's tribe or
operated by an Indian organization, and which meets the
child's needs.
398
These preferences are to be met by applying the prevailing
394. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1988); BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67594; MDHS
Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3611. A child's special needs may override the
requirement of placement close to home. In re Oscar C., 559 NY.S.2d 431, 435
(N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1990). Section 1915 of the ICWA has been called its "most important
substantive requirement." Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30, 36 (1989).
395. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(i) (1988). The reference to the child's extended family
relates to 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) (1988), which defines an extended family member ac-
cording to law or custom of the tribe, including the following relatives over 18 years
of age: grandparent, aunt, uncle, brother, sister, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, niece,
nephew, first cousin, second cousin, stepparent. The legislative history discusses
the reason for the references to extended family members. House Report, supra
note 14, at 10, 20; see also In re Q.G.M., 808 P.2d 684, 686 n.3 (Okla. 1991) and In re
Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1076 (Okla. 1985)(dissenting opinion), cert denied, 484
U.S. 1072 (1988). Although the BIA Guidelines are silent on extended family mem-
bers, the MDHS Regulations track the ICWA. MDHS Regulations, supra note 74,
at XIII-3513(4). The BIA Guidelines under placement preferences emphasize the
importance of the extended family: "The Act clearly recognizes the role of the
child's extended family in helping to raise children. The extended family should be
looked to first when it becomes necessary to remove the child .... BIA Guidelines,
supra note 73, at 67594.
396. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(ii) (1988).
397. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(iii) (1988).
398. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(iv) (1988). See also BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at
67594; MDHS Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3611.
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social and cultural standards of the community in which the par-
ent and extended family live or maintain social ties.3s 9 The tribe is
permitted to establish a different order of preferences,400 however,
and the preference of the child or parent must be considered.40 1
Congress indicated in the ICWA's legislative history that, although
section 1915 establishes a federal policy of keeping Indian children
within the Indian community, it does not mean that the child can
never be placed with a non-Indian family.40 2
The good cause to the contrary exception to section 1915 has
generated far less discussion and many fewer appellate decisions
than the similar exception to transferring a case to tribal court.
The BIA Guidelines provide that the burden of establishing good
cause to the contrary, at least with regard to non-adoptive place-
ments, is with the party seeking to avoid the preferences.4 3 The
Guidelines establish three types of good cause:
- the request of the parent, or of the child if the child is of
sufficient age;40
4
- the child's extraordinary physical or emotional needs, if es-
tablished by qualified expert testimony;405
- the unavailability of suitable families for placement after a
diligent search.4° 6
The MDHS Regulations add two other types of good cause: the re-
quest of an older sibling and a lack of necessary specialized treat-
ment services. Good cause in this context does not include the
child's best interests.40 7 The preferences contained in the Minne-
399. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988); MDHS Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3610.
400. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1988); BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67594; MDHS
Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3613.
401. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1988); MDHS Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3614.
See In re Oscar C., 559 N.Y.S.2d 431, 434 (N.Y. Far. Ct. 1990).
402. House Report, supra note 14, at 23.
403. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67594. See In re Bird Head, 331 N.W.2d
785, 790-91 (Neb. 1983).
404. Id. See In re C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105, 116 (Neb. 1992).
405. Id. Although this guideline requires qualified expert testimony only to
show the child's extraordinary physical and emotional needs, In re J.R.H., 358
N.W.2d 311, 321 (Iowa 1984) suggests that expert testimony is needed not only for
the three types of "good cause" listed in the BIA Guidelines, but also for the consid-
eration of cultural adjustments; see also In re C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105, 117 (Neb. 1992);
In re M.T.S., - N.W.2d - (Minn. Ct. App. September 15,1992).
406. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67594.
407. MDHS Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3611. While the reported cases
on good cause to contrary are sparse, some courts have held that the best interests
of the child constitute good cause, despite the fact that it is not mentioned in the
BIA Guidelines. In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 667 P.2d 228,
234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 870 (Okla. 1988); In re T.R.M.,
525 N.E.2d 298, 311-12 (Ind. 1988); see also In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77, 81 (Mont. 1990),
cert denied, 111 S.Ct. 2013 (1991). As we have already noted, supra note 212, in the
discussion of good cause not to transfer to tribal court, both the ICWA and a new
Minnesota statute specifically override, insofar as native children are concerned,
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sota Minority Heritage Act are not nearly as specific, though they
are compatible with those of the ICWA.408 They also contain a
provision for honoring a parent's request not to follow them.4 m9
2. Adoptive Placements
Adoptive placements are controlled by section 1915(a), which
does not contain the language of section 1915(b) regarding the
least restrictive setting and proximity to the child's home. Adop-
tive placements must be arranged in the absence of good cause to
the contrary according to these preferences:41
0
- a member of the child's extended family;
41
- other members of the child's tribe;412
the traditional best interests of the child standard. MINN. STAT. § 260.011, subd. 2,
enacted in 1990, states that the child's best interests must be determined consistent
with the ICWA and the Indian Family Preservation Act. The only Minnesota deci-
sion on this point that we know of specifically held that the ICWA preempts Min-
nesota's best interests of the child standard. In re M.T.S., No. FX-91-50419 (Minn.
Dist. Ct., 7th Dist., filed January 16, 1992), affirmed, - N.W.2d - (Minn. Ct. App.
September 15, 1992). A copy of the decision is on file with LAw & INEQUALITY.
Good cause may include cultural adjustments, but does not include socioeconomic
considerations. In re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d at 321-22; but see In re Coconino County
Juvenile Action, 736 P.2d 829, 832 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). The "good cause" require-
ment has been held to provide state courts with flexibility in determining place-
ments. In re T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 311 (Ind. 1988). One court has implied that
the same forum non conveniens rule that it invoked to prevent transfer of a case to
tribal court under § 1911(b) (see text accompanying notes 221-28 supra) may also be
good cause under § 1915. Chester County Dept. of Social Services v. Coleman, 399
S.E.2d 773, 776 (S.C.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2017 (1991).
408. MIN. STAT. § 260.181, subd. 3 (1990) establishes three preferences: a rela-
tive, a person of the same racial or ethnic heritage, a person who is knowledgeable
and appreciative of the child's racial and ethnic heritage. There are not many Min-
nesota decisions on this statute. See, e.g., In re M.M., 436 N.W.2d 827 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989), rev'd, 452 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 1990). As we have already noted, supra
note 57, the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently invalidated a portion of the Mi-
nority Heritage Act on equal protection grounds. In re D.L., 479 N.W.2d 408 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991). The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed that decision, but did not
address the constitutional issue. In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1992). After the
appellate court's decision, the Legislature amended the Minority Heritage Act to
address the court's concerns, and specified that preferences must be given to rela-
tives, irrespective of race. 1992 Minn. Laws, ch. 557.
409. MINN. STAT. § 260.181, subd. 3 (1990).
410. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988). See In re M.E.M., 725 P.2d 212, 214 (Mont. 1986);
In re Coconino County Juvenile Action, 736 P.2d 829, 832 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
411. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (1988). An extended family member has the right to
intervene in an adoption placement proceeding, notwithstanding the fact that the
intervention section, 25 U.S.C. 1911(c) (1988) is limited on its face to foster place-
ments and terminations. In re M.E.M., 725 P.2d 212, 213-14 (Mont. 1986). See also
In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d 10, 15-16 (Alaska 1984); In re Baby Girl A., 282 Cal. Rptr. 105,
108-109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210, 1215-16 (Alaska 1981).
412. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) (1988).
Law and Inequality [Vol. 10:311
- other Indian families.413
As is the case with the other placements, the tribe can estab-
lish a different order of preference and the court must consider
the preferences of the parent and child.414 The social and cultural
standards requirement also applies to adoptive placements.415 The
good cause to the contrary exception is the same as that for non-
adoptive placements under both the BIA Guidelines and the
MDHS Regulations.416
The Minority Heritage Act contains the same provision for
adoptive placements as that for other placements.417 Application
of the Minority Heritage Act to placement proceedings is espe-
cially important to the Minnesota lawyer. Although a person ag-
grieved by a wrongful placement has the same right of appeal to
the appellate courts as does any other litigant, the ICWA does not
permit the type of collateral attack upon a placement under 1915
that it permits for other violations of the ICWA under 1914.418
Although no Minnesota appellate cases have squarely ad-
dressed the section 1915 issues, a recent decision of the Court of
Appeals which applied the requirement of extended family place-
ment to section 1912(d) suggests that section 1915 will be enforced
in the same manner.
419
413. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) (1988). The BIA approves single-parent families. BIA
Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67594.
414. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1988). See In re Baby Girl A., 282 Cal. Rptr. 105, 110
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
415. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
416. BIA Guidelines, supra note 73, at 67594; MDHS Regulations, supra note 74
at XIII-3611.
417. MINN. STAT. § 260.242, subd. 1(a) (1990). See also MINN. STAT. § 259.28, subd.
2 (1990); MDHS Regulations, supra note 74, at XIII-3612. See note 407, supra.
418. See 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1988); In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d 10, 15-16 (Alaska 1984);
B.R.T. v. Social Servs. Bd., 391 N.W.2d 594, 601 (N.D. 1986); State ex. reL Juvenile
Dep't v. Woodruff, 816 P.2d 623, 625 (Or. Ct. App. 1991); In re Baby Girl A., 282 Cal.
Rptr. 105, 108-109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). For this reason, the J.R.S. court held that
the tribe has the right to intervene in the adoption proceeding despite language in
25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1988) restricting interventions to foster care placements and
terminations. In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d at 15-19. See also E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210,
1215-16 (Alaska 1981)(grandparents have same right of intervention in adoptions);
In re M.E.M., 725 P.2d 212, 213-14 (Mont. 1986)(paternal aunt).
419. In re M.S.S., 465 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). See also note 407, supra
for a discussion of the recent decision in In re M.T.S.. It will not be long before
more 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988) issues are before Minnesota courts. A recent report of
the Department of Human Services suggests that Minnesota's compliance with the
placement preferences of the ICWA and Minority Heritage Acts leaves a great deal
to be desired. See Minn. Dep't. of Human Services, "Monitoring of Hennepin
County Compliance With Laws Respecting Cultural Heritage," (January, 1991) (on
file with LAW & INEQUALITY). Enforcement actions are being considered by local
ICWA litigators.
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VIII. Conclusion
Minnesota lawyers hold the key to enforcement of their na-
tive clients' rights under both the ICWA and the Minnesota stat-
utes discussed in this article. These statutes were not enacted in a
vacuum; the circumstances demanded their enactment. As the leg-
islative history of the ICWA illustrates, the rights of native parents
and their tribes have been traditionally abridged by state courts
and state child protection agencies. We hope we have provided
Minnesota lawyers the tools they need to claim and enforce the
rights provided by these statutes.
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